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I. Introduction 
Violence has hit the public schools. Images of students shooting each 
other rerun in the nation's mind, like a recurring nightmare. To establish 
order in the classrooms, teachers and administrators themselves have used 
physical force to corporally punish and to grasp out-of-control students.1 Us-
ing physical force implicates a student's constitutional right to personal secur-
ity,Z a right safeguarded by both the Fourth3 and Fourteenth Amendments.4 
1 Several educational psychologists have contended that striking children as punishment 
teaches students to be violent and undermines their ability to learn. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, 
Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to Control and Pun-
ish Students,_ CoRNELL J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y _, _ (2001) (forthcoming). States have differed in 
the authority that they give school officials to use physical force as punishment. See infra note 
117 (listing state statutes). Some school districts have expressly adopted policies prohibiting 
corporal punishment, while at the same time recognizing that school officials may need to use 
force to control disruptive students. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 143 
F.3d 679, 680 n.l (2d Cir. 1998): 
Corporal punishment is not an effective means of developing self-discipline. The 
[Brentwood Union Free School] District will not condone or accept the use of 
physical force (corporal punishment) upon a pupil for the purpose of punishing that 
pupil. Reasonable physical force used for the following purposes is not to be mis-
construed as corporal punishment: (1) to protect oneself from physical injury; (2) to 
protect another pupil or teacher or any other person from physical injury; (3) to 
protect the property of the school or of others; (4) to restrain or remove a pupil 
whose behavior is interfering with the orderly exercise and performance of school 
district functions, powers or duties, if that pupil has refused to comply with a re-
quest to refrain from further disruptive acts. 
Some courts have distinguished between force to punish students and force to restrain students, 
but nevertheless have applied the same analysis to both types of claims. See, e.g., Jones v. Wilin-
ski, 931 F. Supp. 364, 367 (M.D. Pa. 1996): 
Strictly speaking, [the student] does not allege that he was subjected to excessive 
corporal punishment. Our interpretation of this claim is that [the teacher] used 
excessive force in attempting to remove him physically from his chair and propel 
him toward the door after ordering him to leave the classroom. The allegations are, 
however, closely enough allied with claims of corporal punishment that cases in-
volving the latter apply analogous principles and provide useful guidelines for de-
ciding the [teacher's] summary judgment motion. 
2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") has charac-
terized this "right" in numerous ways: "the right to bodily integrity, the right to be free from 
'unjustified intrusions on personal security,' ... the right to be free from excessive force, [and] 
the right to be free from arbitrary and excessive corporal punishment." P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 
1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)) (internal cita-
tions omitted). See also Wallace ex rei. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 
(7th Cir. 1995) (examining whether a teacher unreasonably restricted a student's interest in "lib-
erty" under the Fourth Amendment when he grabbed a student's elbow to expedite the student's 
departure). Most courts, however, have analyzed students' physical force claims under the sub-
stantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. 
See, e.g., Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000) ("We ... join 
the vast majority of Circuits in confirming that excessive corporal punishment, at least where not 
administered in conformity with a valid policy authorizing corporal punishment[,] ... may be 
actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and 
conscience-shocking behavior."). 
3 U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
4 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
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The Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause, 
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures,''5 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bars deprivations of "life" and "liberty without due process."6 Both 
amendments protect the historic right to personal security.? Nevertheless, 
under "the Rule of Graham,''8 only one amendment applies when officials 
use physical force: "[W]here another provision of the Constitution 'provides 
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection,' a court must assess a 
s U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. This Article uses the phrase the "Fourth Amendment" as 
shorthand for the rights that students have under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (stating that the "Fourteenth Amendment extends [the Fourth Amendment] 
guarantee to searches and seizures by state officials, . . . including public school officials") (citing 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985)). 
6 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. This Article discusses the substantive due process component 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and only briefly refers to its protection of procedural due pro-
cess. See infra Part ll.E.2 & Part III.A.2. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 
{1990) (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses 
three types of claims: {!)"specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights"; (2) a "substantive 
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of 
the procedures used to implement them"' (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 
(1986)); and {3) "a guarantee of fair procedure"). For discussion of substantive due process 
claims see, for example, London v. Dirs. of the Dewitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873, 877 {8th Cir. 
1999) (recognizing that a coach's use of force implicated a student's Fourteenth Amendment 
interest in personal security, but deciding that the force was constitutional because it was not 
"shocking to the conscience"); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that "at some point the administration of corporal punishment may violate a student's 
liberty interest in his personal security and substantive due process rights"); Metzger ex ref. 
Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520-21 {3d Cir. 1988) (stating that disciplining a student by 
using excessive force may violate the child's liberty interest safeguarded by substantive due pro-
cess); Webb v. McCulloch, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing grant of summary 
judgment for school principal, and holding that substantive due process applied because the 
"need to strike [the student] was so minimal or non-existent that the alleged blows were a brutal 
and inhumane abuse of . . . official power, literally shocking to the conscience"); Garcia ex. rel. 
Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656 {lOth Cir. 1987) (stating that corporal punishments "that are 
so grossly excessive as to be shocking to the conscience violate substantive due process rights, 
without regard to the adequacy of state remedies"); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 
1980) (stating that corporal punishment is actionable under substantive due process if it 
"amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the con-
science"); Jones v. Witinski, 931 F. Supp. 364, 366 {M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that "disciplinary 
corporal punishment of public school students by teachers or administrators" may "give rise to a 
claim under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Meyer ex. rei. 
Wyrick v. Litwiller, 749 F. Supp. 981, 985-87 (W.D. Mo. 1990) {denying summary judgment of 
substantive due process claims against teacher who did not know why he hit the student on the 
head with his grade book, allegedly causing student to have neck and back pain). 
7 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (stating that "[t]he right of 
personal security is . . . protected by the Fourth Amendment, which was made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment because its protection was viewed as 'implicit in "the 
concept of ordered liberty" ... enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of 
English-speaking peoples'" (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1949))); see also Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (stating that a police officer's frisking of a person for weapons "is a 
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 772 {1966) (noting that "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our 
society"). 
s Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 {1989). See infra Part ll.D. 
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plaintiff's claims under that explicit provision and 'not the more generalized 
notion of "substantive due process.""'9 
For students challenging school officials' use of force, the difference be-
tween the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments matters doctrinally: officials 
violate the Fourth Amendment when they "unreasonably" seize a person, 10 
but they violate the Fourteenth Amendment only when their actions "shock-
the-conscience."11 The Graham rule thus creates a constitutional chasm-if 
the Fourth Amendment applies to evaluating the constitutionality of school 
officials' use of force, then students stand on the more protective ground of a 
"reasonableness" standard; but if the Fourteenth Amendment applies, they 
fall into the deep chasm of the Fourteenth Amendment's difficult "shocks-
the-conscience" standard. 
Historically, students have fallen into this chasm when they have used 
the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
challenge a school official's authority to hit them as punishment for violating 
school rules.12 In contrast, courts have provided students with greater pro-
9 Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,293 (1999) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395). Graham 
also stated that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or 
not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 
'substantive due process' approach." !d. The Court recently quoted this "rule" again in County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 528 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). For a discussion of Lewis, see infra Part II.E.2. 
10 See infra Part II.D. 
11 See infra Part II.E.2. 
12 Federal courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as affording little protec-
tion to students challenging disciplinary action. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 
F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that an official's slapping of a student across the face, 
which did not result in "physical injury," was not actionable under the substantive due process 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment because the slapping was not "brutal" or "i: hu-
mane"); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560,565 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[e]ven if the 
corporal punishment is excessive and beyond the common law privilege accorded school teach-
ers it does not necessarily follow that the student's substantive due process rights have been 
violated" and further explaining that actionable conduct must be "shocking to the conscience 
and amount to a severe invasion of the student's personal security and autonomy"); Jones v. 
Witinski, 931 F. Supp. 364, 371 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that a teacher's grabbing of a student to 
remove him from his chair did not constitute a substantive due process violation because the 
teacher lacked the intent to cause harm); Brooks v. Sch. Bd., 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1535-36 (E.D. 
Va. 1983) (holding that no Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred when a teacher stuck a 
student's arm with a straight pin to punish the student because this action did not "descend to 
the level of a brutal and inhumane, conscience-shocking, episode"). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit") has significantly 
and erroneously limited the scope of these substantive due process claims by holding that stu-
dents have no substantive due process claim if state law provides adequate post-hitting remedies. 
See, e.g., Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting a principal's motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a violation of substantive due process because state law provided both 
civil and criminal remedies); accord Harris v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 882 F. Supp. 90, 90-91 
(N.D. Miss. 1995) (citing numerous Fifth Circuit cases dismissing students' corporal punishment 
claims because "adequate post-punishment remedies" were available). In 1990, the United 
States Supreme Court clearly stated that substantive due process claims do not invite considera-
tion of whether state law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies. See Zinermon v. Burch, 
494 u.s. 113, 125 (1990). 
In addition, the Supreme Court in dicta has stated that schools have no Fourteenth Amend-
ment duty to protect students from hurting each other, even though students are often subject to 
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tection when the students have invoked the Fourth Amendment to challenge 
school officials' searches13 of their property or person for drugs, other types 
of contraband, or stolen property.14 
The purpose of this Article is to advocate applying the Fourth Amend-
ment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, to evaluate the constitutionality of 
school officials' intentional use of physical force to control or punish stu-
dents.15 Many actions by school officials, in light of the Court's jurisprudence 
compulsory attendance laws. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995). 
When school officials sexually assault students, however, substantive due process protects their 
right to personal security. See, e.g., Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 
432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "public school children have a constitutionally protected 
right not to be sexually abused by school employees at school"); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 
15 F.3d 443,445 (5th Cir.1994) (en bane) (holding that "schoolchildren do have a liberty interest 
in their bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and that physical sexual abuse by a school employee violated that right"); Stoneking v. 
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment encompasses "a student's right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers"); 
Laura Oren, Section 1983 and Sex Abuse in Schools: Making a Federal Case Out of It, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 747, 817 (1997) (arguing that "it is necessary to derive the claims of students 
sexually abused by their teachers from the Constitution of the United States, and not from ordi-
nary crimes and torts"). 
Scholars have also discussed the lack of protection substantive due process affords school-
children from excessive corporal punishment. See, e.g., Victoria N. Benz, Corporal Punishment 
in Today's Public Schools: Child Discipline or Legal Abuse, 13 J. Juv. L. 13, 25-26 (1992) (argu-
ing that the courts' failure to define what is shocking conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment 
is "startling because much of the corporal punishment now administered would probably be 
deemed excessive by the general public, especially in light of this nation's heightened awareness 
of child abuse"); Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public 
Schools: Jurisprudence That Is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REv. 276, 310 
(1994) ("[T]hus far, most federal courts have adopted a hands-off approach, in part because 
corporal punishment is still viewed as a time-honored tradition. . . . Let us not allow more 
children to be irreparably damaged simply because of the historical pedigree of schoolroom 
beatings."); Irene M. Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Pro-
cess Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 
399, 400 (1990) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit for denying all substantive due process protection 
when students have available state tort remedies); Carolyn P. Weiss, Curbing Violence or Teach-
ing It: Criminal Immunity for Teachers Who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WASH. U. L. REv. 
1251, 1273 (1996) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "standard established by the cir-
cuits . . . renders federal substantive protection inherently inadequate and inconsequential"). 
See generally Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal 
Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 353, 359 (1998) 
(examining parents' and other custodians' authority to use corporal punishment). 
13 The cases litigated under the Fourth Amendment have focused on school searches, not 
seizures, of students and their property. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 10.11 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (collecting cases in 
which school officials have searched students). In his introduction, Professor LaFave summa-
rized the major issues the cases consider: first, whether the Fourth Amendment applies to school 
officials' actions; second, whether school officials can give effective third party consent to 
searches of students by police officers; and third, whether the exclusionary rule applies to evi-
dence found during searches made by school officials. I d. at 802. This Article focuses on Fourth 
Amendment "seizures" of students. 
14 See infra notes 244-257 and accompanying text. 
15 See, e.g., P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "several courts 
have, post-Graham, still described a student's right to be free from excessive force in terms of 
substantive due process" and noting that one "circuit has applied the Fourth Amendment to a 
6 The George Washington Law Review [Vol 69:1 
teacher's use of force against a student"). In Koch, however, the Ninth Circuit did not decide 
whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applied to the use of force by a school official, 
because the force used was so egregious that it violated the standards of either amendment. /d. 
at 1303. 
One of the few decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to school officials' use of force 
against students is Wallace ex. rel Wallace v. 'Batavia School District, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 
1995): 
We thus hold that, in the context of a public school, a teacher or administrator who 
seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only when the re-
striction of liberty is unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and ap-
parent. Therefore, in seeking to maintain order and discipline, a teacher or 
administrator is simply constrained to taking reasonable action to achieve those 
goals. Depending on the circumstances, reasonable action may certainly include 
the seizure of a student in the face of provocative or disruptive behavior. 
After determining that the use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ("Seventh Circuit") also held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not afford the student "any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment 
from unwarranted discipline while in school." /d. at 1015. 
In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977), examined 
the procedural due process protections students have when they receive corporal punishment, 
briefly mentioning the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of personal security is also protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . . It 
has been said of the Fourth Amendment that its overriding function ... is to pro-
tect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. But 
the principal concern of that Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is with intrusions on privacy in the course of criminal investi-
gations. (The students] do not contend that the Fourth Amendment applies, ac-
cording to its terms, to corporal punishment in public schools. 
/d. (citations omitted). Even though the Supreme Court in its 1985 decision, New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), applied the Fourth Amendment to searches occurring within public 
schools for violations of school rules, several courts have nevertheless interpreted the dicta in 
Ingraham as precluding application of the Fourth Amendment to students' corporal punishment 
claims. See, e.g., Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding without analysis 
that "the paddling of recalcitrant students does not constitute a fourth amendment search or 
seizure"); Gaither v. Barron, 924 F. Supp. 134, 135 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (briefly referring to 
Ingraham's statement that the principal concern of the Fourth Amendment was with "criminal 
investigations"); Thrasher v. General Cas. Co., 732 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (stating 
that the Seventh Circuit's limits on applying the Fourth Amendment and Ingraham's statement 
did not require it to apply the Fourth Amendment to a student's claim that a teacher used exces-
sive force to discipline him; also holding that material facts were in dispute as to whether the 
force violated the student's personal security interests as safeguarded by the substantive due 
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Thrasher court stated in dicta that, 
although the student "was seized within the literal meaning of that term when he was pushed, 
thrown or shoved against the chalkboard, this contact constitute( d) a de minimus level of imposi-
tion that does not warrant the invocation of Fourth Amendment protection." /d. 
Only the Fifth Circuit, when examining the use of force by school officials under substantive 
due process, has considered whether students might have available state tort remedies. See Fee, 
900 F.2d at 808. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
We harbor no opinion as to the severity of the student's injuries in this case. We 
hold only that since Texas has civil and criminal laws in place to proscribe educators 
from abusing their charges, and further provides adequate post-punishment relief 
in favor of students, no substantive due process concerns are implicated because no 
arbitrary state action exists. 
/d. at 810. Under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of coextensive state law remedies, 
however, is irrelevant to establishing whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. 
See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (stating that "the Due Process Clause 
contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful governmental ac-
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limiting the reach of substantive due process, now constitute "seizures" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.16 In examining personal se-
curity claims similar to those that students could pursue, the Supreme Court 
has considered the Fourth Amendment when police intentionally use physi-
cal force during investigatory stops,t? arrests,18 and high-speed vehicular 
chases, 19 and when police officers deprive a citizen of liberty by filing crimi-
nal charges against the citizen.20 Lower federal courts have also relied on the 
Fourth Amendment, rather than the substantive due process component of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, in evaluating police officers' use of physical 
force against citizens.21 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when offi-
cials use physical force to "seize" a person, the Fourth Amendment, not the 
Fourteenth Amendment, applies.22 It also recently explained that a prior de-
cision based on substantive due process "today would be treated under the 
Fourth Amendment, albeit with the same result."23 
These decisions raise as many questions as they purport to answer-in-
cluding why a person's interest in personal security must be "covered" by 
tions ... regardless of any state·tort remedy that might be available to compensate ... for the 
deprivation" (emphasis added)). 
16 Although the Supreme Court and other federal courts have evaluated seizures of stu-
dents under the Fourth Amendment if a search first occurred, most litigation involving the use of 
force to control or discipline students in the absence of a preliminary search has occurred under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 12. 
17 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (police tackling suspect after be 
tossed drugs while running); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (officials slamming 
uncooperative suspect against car during investigation). For a discussion of these cases, see infra 
text accompanying notes 140-146. 
18 See Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (using force by setting up a 
roadblock to stop a fleeing motorist); Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (shooting fleeing 
felon in the back); Wmston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (obtaining warrant to authorize 
surgery to remove bullet from suspect); for a· discussion of these cases, see infra Part III.B.l. 
19 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). For a discussion of this case, see 
infra Part II.E.2. 
20 See, e.g., Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 
"pretrial restrictions on travel and required attendance at court bearings constitute a seizure"). 
But see Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J., concurring) (stating that 
"circuit courts are divided both on the application of the Fourth Amendment post-arraignment 
and on whether mere requirements of the posting of a bond and appearance at pretrial hearings, 
without more, constitute a 'seizure"'). See generally Andrew G. Ferguson, Continuing Seizure: 
Fourth Amendment Seizure in Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Cases, in 15 NAT'L LAWYERS 
GuiLD CIVIL LIBERTIES CoMM. CIVIL RIGIITS LmGATION & ArroRNEY FEES HANDBOOK 4-1, 
4-7 to 4-26 (Steven Saltzman, ed. 1999) (summarizing how U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have examined the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to malicious prosecution claims). 
21 See infra Part III.B.2. See generally MICHAEL A VERY ET AL., PoLICE MiscoNDucr LIT-
IGATION § 2.14-2.18 (3d ed. 1998) (summarizing numerous Fourth Amendment unreasonable 
force claims brought against police officers). 
22 See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
23 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 n.9. The Court reframed Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952) as a Fourth Amendment case. Rochin had held that police officers, who forced a suspect 
to swallow an emetic after he swallowed drugs, engaged in conscience shocking conduct that 
violated the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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only a single amendment. In light of the Court's doctrinal structure requiring 
only one constitutional source, this Article advocates evaluating the constitu-
tionality of school officials' uses of force under the Fourth Amendment, not 
the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 
Part II begins with an historical perspective, revealing that courts ini-
tially examined all physical force claims under a single standard, without 
specifying the constitutional amendment providing this protection. Federal 
courts of appeal traditionally applied the four "Glick factors" that Justice 
Friendly created in 1973:25 (1) the need for the force, (2) the relationship 
between the need and the amount of force, (3) the extent of injury, and ( 4) 
the presence of malicious intent to harm.26 From 1978 to 1998, the Supreme 
Court began to limit these factors as it evaluated the constitutionality of offi-
24 In analyzing the scope of substantive due process, several courts have contrasted school 
officials' use of physical force to discipline students with the abuse of officials' power to sexually 
abuse or harass students. See, e.g., Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the "extent of harm inflicted by sexual abuse is immeasurable" and adding that "in 
contrast to corporal punishment, sexual abuse is never inflicted in 'good faith'"); Stoneking v. 
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a] teacher's sexual 
molestation of a student is an intrusion of the schoolchild's bodily integrity not substantively 
different for constitutional purposes from corporal punishment by teachers" with respect to put-
ting school official on notice that their sexual behavior violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
Similarly, when police officers use force to assault a person sexually, courts continue to 
apply the Fourteenth and not the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 
628 (4th Cir. 1997). In Jones, a woman claimed that a police officer, after giving her a warning 
for an alleged traffic offense, raped her before he drove her home. !d. at 622. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit") applied the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Because the harm inflicted did not occur in the course of an attempted arrest or 
apprehension of one suspected of criminal conduct, . . . the claim was not one of a 
Fourth Amendment violation, but of the violation of the substantive due process 
right under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under 
color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm. 
Id. at 628. For a similar analysis, see United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,262 (1997) (discussing 
a district court's analysis of a state court judge's alleged sexual assaults under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and quoting jury instruction that framed the issue as whether the conduct was 
"shocking to one's consci[ence]"). 
25 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). For discussion of these factors, see 
infra Part II.E.2. 
26 See, e.g., Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Hall noted the parallel be-
tween its standard for evaluating police brutality claims and whether school officials used exces-
sive force: 
As in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry in 
school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury 
so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by 
malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it 
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the 
conscience. 
/d. (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). Other courts have also applied the Glick factors to claims 
involving school officials' hitting of students. See, e.g., Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist. 855 F.2d 
650, 564 (8th Cir. 1988). In Wise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ("Eighth 
Circuit") stated: 
We believe that a substantive due process claim in the context of disciplinary corpo-
ral punishment is to be considered under the following test: 1) the need for the 
application of corporal punishment; 2) the relationship between the need and the 
amount of punishment administered; 3) the extent of injury inflicted; and 4) 
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cials using physical force in a variety of contexts.27 These decisions resulted 
in the Court enunciating the Graham rule (only one constitutional amend-
ment applies to the use of physical force) and in limiting certain Glick factors 
to specific amendments.28 
Consequently, under current law, the Fourth Amendment articulates an 
"unreasonable" standard and applies to persons "seized" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment;29 the Eighth Amendment has a judicially created 
"malice" standard and applies only to prisoners;30 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment has a judicially created "shocks-the-conscience" standard that 
applies to all other persons who are not "seized" and who are not prisoners.31 
Part III focuses on how the Court moved the Fourth Amendment into 
consideration when it examined searches in the public schools.32 To protect 
students' interest in personal security, this section also argues for applying 
the Fourth Amendment to school official's use of physical force. 
Part III also examines the two types of force used by school officials that 
constitute Fourth Amendment seizures: force used to control students and 
force employed to punish students. When school officials grab students who 
are fighting, their actions are similar to police officers trying to control unruly 
whether the punishment was administered in a good faith effort to maintain disci-
pline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 
I d. The WISe Court stated that, even if the coach had maliciously paddled the student, the hitting 
did not 'rise to the level of a substantive due process violation." Id. (The coach hit the student 
on the buttocks twice with a wooden paddle, causing the buttocks to become "reddened and 
slightly bruised." !d.) 
27 See LewiS, 523 U.S. at 842-43 (holding that only the Fourteenth Amendment applies and 
explicitly refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment to a police officer's accidental hitting of a 
motorcycle passenger with his police cruiser, after he chased the fleeing driver of a motorcycle); 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95 (explicitly refusing to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to police 
officers' use of physical force during an investigatory stop and declaring that only the Fourth 
Amendment applies); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (applying the Fourth 
Amendment to officers using a roadblock to stop a fleeing motorist); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (evaluating a police officer's shooting of a fleeing felon under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
28 See infra Part II.D-E. 
29 See, e.g., LewiS, 528 U.S. at 842-50 (holding that the Fourth Amendment's unreasona-
bleness standard did not apply because police officer's accidental hitting of a fleeing motorist 
with his cruiser was not a seizure); Graham, 490 U.S. at 398-99 (vacating and remanding because 
lower court erroneously included malice as an inquiry under the Fourth Amendment's unreason-
ableness standard); Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-22 (holding that police officer's intentional shooting 
of a fleeing unarmed burglary suspect was an unreasonable seizure). For a discussion of these 
cases, see infra Part II.E.2. 
30 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (holding that prisoners must prove under the 
Eighth Amendment that prison guards acted maliciously in using force to discipline them and 
that the force used was not "de minimus"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1985) (hold-
ing that, in the context of subduing a riot, the presence or absence of malice is the appropriate 
standard for evaluating the constitutionality of prison guards' use of force). 
31 LewiS, 523 U.S at 847-49. For a discussion of this case, see infra Part II.E.2. 
32 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (holding that school 
officials' drug testing of athletes was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-43 (1985) (applying the Fourth Amendment to school offi-
cials' search of student's purse to discover cigarettes). For a discussion of these cases, see infra 
Part III.A. 
10 The George Washington Law Review [Vol 69:1 
citizens-this use of force is a Fourth Amendment seizure. But, when school 
officials use force to punish students, the analogy of their actions to police 
officers is less clear. Nevertheless, such force constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment seizure because it remains an intentional acquisition of physical control 
over students. 
The Article concludes by noting that applying the Fourth Amendment to 
the intentional use of physical force by school officials does not unduly re-
strict school personnel in exercising their duties. The Fourth Amendment 
allows school officials significant discretion in determining reasonable educa-
tional policies, including the potential use of force. Nevertheless, these poli-
cies must be reasonable in order to safeguard students' Fourth Amendment 
interest in personal security. 
II. The History of Physical Force Litigation: Moving to Identify a 
"Single" Constitutional Amendment 
The history of physical force litigation reveals a fascinating path that has 
narrowed with each passing decade. In the 1970s, shortly after the birth of 
vigorous constitutional tort litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,33 suspects, pre-
trial detainees, prisoners, and students sued governmental officials, alleging 
that the force used against them was unconstitutional.34 In considering these 
claims, courts often did not explicitly specify what constitutional provisions 
that the officials may have violated. Instead, courts and juries usually mea-
sured the constitutionality of force by considering the four common-sense 
Glick factors: the need for force, the relationship between the need and the 
amount, the extent of injury, and the official's good or bad faith.35 In sharp 
contrast, courts today, adhering to more recent Supreme Court precedent, 
must evaluate the right to personal security only under the single amendment 
that applies to the specific factual situation litigated--either the Fourth, 
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment.36 
Although the Court characterizes its constitutional force decisions as be-
ing neatly rooted in either textual or historical analysis of a particular amend-
ment, ultimately the Court has simply balanced a variety of interests. On one 
side of the scale is the injured person's interest in personal security; on the 
other side is society's interest in effective law enforcement, discipline, or con-
33 See, e.g., lA MARTIN A. ScHWARTZ & JoHN E. KIRKLIN, SEcriON 1983 LITIGATION: 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.1 at 3 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that Section 1983 constitutional tort 
litigation "lay relatively dormant prior to 1961"); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the 
Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 567 (2000) (noting that the 
expansion of liability for police officers is due to the Supreme Court's broad state action doc-
trine: "The modern reading of the Bill of Rights as a comprehensive regulation of the conduct of 
government officers is possible only because of the Court's expansive redefinition of officer mis-
conduct as a form of government action. Officer misconduct was not viewed as government 
illegality at the time of the framing."). 
34 See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to 
Personal Security under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation 
of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REv. 173, 204-29 (1987). 
35 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the federal courts' evaluation of personal security 
claims under these provisions). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 139-153. 
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trol. One may also link the individual's interest in personal security to soci-
ety's interest in preventing unnecessary governmental force: safeguarding the 
individual from force also protects society by checking governmental abuse. 
The Supreme Court's decisions on physical force litigation under the 
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments reveal both this implicit bal-
ancing of interests and the Court's rigid focus on selecting a single amend-
ment to be the "right" source of protection. How the Court has balanced 
interests and applied a single amendment has depended upon how it charac-
terized a particular context: officials who use objectively unreasonable force 
violate a "seized" individual's Fourth Amendment right; prison officials who 
maliciously use force violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment right; and offi-
cials who use shocking force violate a person's substantive due process right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Common Law: Blackstone and the Development of the Historic 
Glick Factors 
The Fourth,37 Eighth,38 and Fourteenth39 Amendments protect a per-
son's right to personal security, a right that is also protected at common 
law.40 In describing a person's constitutional right to bodily integrity, the 
Supreme Court has looked to the common law for guidance.41 Which 
37 See, e.g., Wmston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (stating that the "Fourth Amendment 
generally protects the 'security' of 'persons"'); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968) (stating 
that"[ e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, 
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and 
perhaps humiliating e"1'erience"). 
38 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (stating that "in addressing the 
scope of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, this Court has 
found it useful to refer to '[t]raditional common law concepts, ... and to the 'attitude[s] which 
our society has traditionally taken.'") (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S 514, 535, 531 (1968) 
(plurality opinion)). 
39 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998). In describing its 
shocks-the-conscience standard for substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Lewis Court explained that the common law protections for personal security 
were broader than those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
I d. 
It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept of conscience shocking 
duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, but rather points clearly 
away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at the ends of the tort law's spectrum 
of culpability. . . . [L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath 
the threshold of constitutional due process .... It is, on the contrary, behavior at 
the other end of the culpability spectrum that would most probably support a sub-
stantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by 
any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to con-
science-shocking level. 
40 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). The Hodari Court examined 
the common law: 
We have long understood that the Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unrea-
sonable ... seizures' includes seizure of the person . . . . For most purposes at 
common law, the word ["seizure"] connoted not merely grasping, or applying phys-
ical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it 
\vithin physical control. 
41 Both the Supreme Court and Fourth Amendment scholars have written volumes 
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amendment applies depends upon the circumstances surrounding the use of 
force. In short, fact-specific analysis forms the core of modern constitutional 
force litigation. 
describing the common law and quarreling about its significance when interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment's text. Professor Akhil Amar has been a strong proponent of interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment to focus on whether the governmental action was reasonable. See AKHIL R. 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1998) (stating that "[w]henever ... [a warrantless] search or 
seizure occurred, a jury, guided by a judge in a public trial and able to hear arguments from both 
sides of the case, could typically assess the reasonableness of government action in an after-the-
fact tort suit"); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 (1997) (ar-
guing that the "First Principle" of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness). In contrast, and 
more traditionally, many scholars have interpreted reasonableness to presume the need for a 
warrant. See Davies, supra note 33, at 557 n.9, 619-68 (listing extensive scholarly support for this 
view and proceeding to criticize this perspective.) Most recently, Professor Davies contends that 
scholars on both sides of the debate about the Fourth Amendment's historical meaning have 
misinterpreted the historical evidence. !d. at 553-54 (arguing that there is a "lack of any actual 
evidence of a broad reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard in framing-era arrest and 
search law" and also contending that the reason that "the Framers did not address warrantless 
intrusions was that they did not anticipate that a wrongful act by an officer might constitute a 
form of government illegality--rather, they viewed such misconduct as only a personal trespass 
by the person who held the office"). 
Modern Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment no longer reiterate 
that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is the starting point for evaluating whether 
searches and seizures are constitutional. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton. 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 
(1999) (citations omitted). The Houghton Court articulated a two-part inquiry: 
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates [the Fourth 
Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful 
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed .... 
Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under 
traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the .:Iegree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy <•nd, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 
!d. See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (stating "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be 
construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, 
and in a manner in which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of 
individual citizens") (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)); Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). The Vernonia Court also focused on the common 
law: 
Where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of 
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a par-
ticular search meets the reasonableness standard "'is judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests."' 
!d. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Ex' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989), which quoted Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). In contrast, the Court, in a per curiam decision, has recently 
restated the traditional presumption for warrants. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 
(1999) (per curiam) (stating "[a] warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within 
one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement" (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Further examination of the disputes among the Court 
and scholars as to the need for a warrant is not necessary for the purposes of this Article because 
the use of force by school officials, like the use of force by police officers, rarely implicates a 
need for a warrant. But see Winston, 470 U.S. at 767 (holding unreasonable a judicial order 
authorizing surgery to remove a bullet from a suspect). 
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1. The Common Law 
The Court has used the common law as an important, but not disposi-
tive, factor in evaluating two issues: (1) determining which amendment ap-
plies to the force used by governmental officials and (2) assessing the 
constitutionality of force under the amendment selected. 
The Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
vide that no person shall be deprived of "liberty" without due process of 
law.42 The Supreme Court has interpreted the word "liberty" to include the 
common law's protection of bodily integrity: "Among the historic liberties so 
protected was a right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief, for unjusti-
fied intrusions on personal security."43 The Court has observed that the 
Fourth and Eighth Amendments44 also safeguard this liberty interest: "[t]he 
right to personal security is . . . protected by the Fourth Amendment [and 
Eighth Amendment], which [were] made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth because its protection was viewed as 'implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty . . . enshrined in the history and basic constitutional docu-
ments of English-speaking peoples."'45 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone described how the common law pro-
tected personal security in a variety of ways.46 For example, under the com-
mon law, police officers had a right to shoot fleeing felons, but not fleeing 
misdemeanants.47 After determining that the act of intentionally killing a 
suspect was a Fourth Amendment seizure,48 the Supreme Court nevertheless 
refused to use this common law rule to define the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness.49 Instead it has more broadly protected the right to 
personal security than the common law's strict rules by recognizing changing 
circumstances.50 The Court declared that "[b]ecause of sweeping change in 
legal and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in this case 
would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical in-
quiry."51 It rejected the common law rule, in part, because police depart-
ments had begun to refrain from using deadly force against fleeing felons.52 
The Court, however, candidly noted that state statutes did not reveal a "con-
stant or overwhelming trend away from the common-law rule."53 
42 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V & XIV, § 1. 
43 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKsroNE, COM-
MENTARIES *134). 
44 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments against the states). 
45 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 n.61 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)). 
46 4 WILLIAM BLACKsrONE, CoMMENTARIES *289. 
47 See Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoM-
MENTARIES *289). 
48 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
49 Id. at 13. 
so !d. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 18 (noting that "[o]verwhelmingly, [police department policies] are more restric-
tive than the common law rule). 
53 Id. 
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Blackstone also described personal security as a procedural liberty inter-
est that individuals possess when governmental officials inflict "punish-
ment. "54 In determining which amendment applies in personal security 
litigation, the Court has linked this procedural interest in liberty to the partic-
ular factual context. 55 Under the Eighth Amendment, a predeprivation hear-
ing must occur before the government can inflict any criminal 
"punishment";56 but, under the Fourteenth Amendment, such a hearing may 
not always be necessary.57 
The difference between the procedural protections now constitutionally 
required depends upon which common law rule the Court applied. The com-
mon law protected all individuals subject to criminal process.58 The common 
law also distinguished the force used against school children from that used 
against prisoners.59 The Court, in Ingraham, cited Blackstone for the pro-
position that even though an individual had an "absolute right[ ] . . . to 
security from the corporal insults of menace, assaults, beating, and wounding, 
... [it was not] a 'corporal insult' for a teacher to inflict 'moderate correc-
tion' on a child in his care."60 The common law permitted force against a 
child by a teacher if it was "'necessary to answer the purposes for which [the 
teacher] is employed."61 In that circumstance, hitting was "'justifiable or 
lawful.' "62 
The common law privilege to strike a child also depended upon parental 
permission.63 The modem Court rejected this aspect of the common law 
when it allowed teachers to strike students even absent parental consent.64 
State law, for the Court, sufficiently protected schoolchildren's procedu-
ral liberty interests, because that law provided all the "process" due under 
the Due Process Clause.65 State law afforded students an opportunity to sue 
54 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134. 
55 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (stating that "[t]he prisoner and 
the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal 
conviction and incarceration."). 
56 !d. at 667. 
57 !d. at 664. 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (noting that "the balance struck 
by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without a 
warrant, has survived substantially intact"; also adding that "[i]t appears in almost all of the 
States in the form of express statutory authorization"). 
59 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682. 
60 !d. at 661 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *134). 
61 ld. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *453). 
62 Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *453). 
63 See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661-62 (noting that "[a]Ithough the early cases 
viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the parents, the concept of parental delega-
tion has been replaced by the view-more consonant with compulsory education laws-that the 
State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 'for the proper 
education of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline"') (quoting 1 F. HARPER & F. 
JAMES, LAw OF ToRTS§ 3.20, 292 (1956)); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681 
n.1 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "although children may have had fewer rights 
against the private schoolmaster at the time of the framing than they have against public school 
officials today, parents plainly had greater rights then than now"). 
64 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661 n.22 (citing Baker v. Owens, 423 U.S. 907 (1975)). 
65 !d. at 672. 
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for school officials' actions after officials had deprived the students of their 
bodily integrity interests.66 
The procedural protections for liberty thus vary: criminals get 
predeprivation process but students get only postdeprivation process. In jus-
tifying this distinction, the Court noted that "the Framers of the Eighth 
Amendment could not have envisioned our present system of public and 
compulsory education, with its opportunity for noncriminal punishments."67 
To apply the Eighth Amendment to students' punishments would be to 
"wrench the Eighth Amendment from its historical context" focused on crim-
inal punishment.6s 
The Ingraham Court also considered policy reasons for not applying the 
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments to 
schoolchildren.69 Looking to the practices of the states and professionals, it 
stated: "Professional and public opinion is sharply divided on the practice [of 
school teachers hitting students for punishment], and has been for more than 
a century. Yet we can discern no trend toward its elimination."70 Similarly, it 
found that other checks existed to prevent abusive practices: (1) public 
schools are open and subject to scrutiny by the community,71 (2) the commu-
nity may also supervise the schools,72 (3) students may sue school officials 
under state tort law,?J and (4) the state may criminally prosecute physically 
abusive school officials.74 
As it defined the scope of Eighth Amendment constitutional rights, the 
Court considered modem practices as well as common law rules. The Court 
limited the common law rule both as applied to police officers' use of deadly 
force and teachers' use of force to punish children.75 The Court's Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes modem practices by applying "evolv-
ing standards of decency"76 to determine whether criminal punishments are 
constitutional.77 
I d. 
66 Id. at 677. The Ingraham Court stated: 
If the punishment inflicted is later found to have been excessive-not reasonably 
believed at the time to be necessary for the child's discipline or training-the 
school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if 
malice is shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties. 
67 Id. at 668. 
68 Id. at 669. 
69 Id. at 670-71. 
70 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977). 
71 Id. at 670. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 677. 
74 Id. 
75 See supra Part II.A.l. 
76 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), quoted in Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668 n.36. 
77 More recently, Justices have sharply disagreed as to whether modern practices are rele-
vant in defming the scope of protection under the substantive due process component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Compare County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998) 
(considering "contemporary practices") with id. at 860 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) 
(considering "'our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices"' (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 703, 720-22 (1997)). For example, in 1998, the Court stated that whether 
officials violated substantive due process depends both on the "history of liberty protection" and 
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The Court has employed the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to protect aspects of the common law interest in personal security. 
Nevertheless, instead of viewing the right to personal security as an embodi-
ment of a fundamental right protected by numerous provisions of the Consti-
tution, the Court has narrowed and fractured the right to personal security by 
selecting a single amendment for its coverage.78 Examination of the doctrinal 
history of constitutional force litigation reveals this movement and its impor-
tant consequences. To discern the Court's movement and its effects, one 
must consider the foundational Glick79 factors and then examine the Court's 
evaluation of them in different contexts. 
2. The Foundational Glick Factors 
In Glick, decided in 1973, Judge Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit") described four factors for courts to 
consider when determining the constitutionality of force: 
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship be-
tween the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the ex-
tent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a good 
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sa-
distically for the very purpose of causing harm. 80 
Factors one and two simply question whether officials did anything im-
permissible. If the force used was just the "right" amount, then the official 
would have committed neither a constitutional violation nor a state tort. The 
third factor (the injury inflicted) raised a metaphorical and rhetorical ques-
tion-does the force used "rise to the level of a constitutional violation?" 
For example, as Judge Friendly noted, an impermissible shove does not nec-
essarily constitute a constitutional violation, even if the amount of force used 
was "unnecessary. "81 Only the fourth factor created significantly different 
interpretations for the federal courts of appeals: some courts viewed the fac-
on "an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the 
standards of blame generally applied to them." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 n.8. Other justices simi-
larly added that "history and tradition are the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point 
of the substantive due process inquiry. There is room as well for an objective assessment of the 
necessities of law enforcement .... " !d. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) Goined by Justice 
O'Connor). 
78 See infra Section II. 
79 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). 
80 !d. 
81 /d. The Supreme Court repeated this phrase in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 
(1992), as it distinguished a constitutional cause of action from a state tort claim. The Hudson 
Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment not to require that prisoners prove a significant in-
jury: "the absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does 
not end it." /d. at 7. The Court discerned two components to an Eighth Amendment personal 
security claim: a subjective component, which requires proof of malice, and an objective compo-
nent, which is "contextual and responsive to 'contemporary standards of decency.'" /d. at 8 
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The Court explained: "When prison offi-
cials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency 
always are violated." /d. at 9. 
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tor as a "requirement" for a constitutional violation; others interpreted it 
simply as a relevant, but not necessary, inquiry.82 
When the Supreme Court interpreted the constitutionality of force 
under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, it interpreted all 
amendments as considering the first three factors.83 The Court treated differ-
ently the fourth factor, malice: the presence of malice became the sole in-
quiry under the Eighth Amendment;84 the sole inquiry under the substantive 
due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment in certain circum-
stances;85 and an impermissible requirement under the Fourth Amendment in 
all circumstances. 86 
In 1977, the Supreme Court cited the Glick decision when, in Ingraham 
v. Wright,87 it ruled out applying the Eighth Amendment to school officials' 
use of force. The Court discussed personal security in the context of a Four-
teenth Amendment procedural due process claim. Examination of Ingraham 
demonstrates the Court's dramatic shift in its understanding of the right of 
personal security. 
B. Relying on State Law to Remedy Injury to Students' Personal Security 
Interests 
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Ingraham88 is both similar to and 
different from modem personal security litigation. It is similar to modem 
litigation in its refusal to apply the Eighth Amendment to personal security 
claims raised by school children, holding that the Eighth Amendment applies 
to prisoners, not to students.89 But, in sharp contrast to modem litigation, 
and despite its utterance that students have a "strong interest" in personal 
security, the Ingraham Court undervalued students' interests in bodily integ-
rity.90 The link between Ingraham-now a 1977 relic-and modem personal 
security litigation is the Court's repeated consideration of contemporary 
views in assessing the constitutionality of officials' use of force.91 
82 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. Lou1s U. L.J. 205, 209 n.l4 (1991) (collecting cases). 
83 See infra text accompanying notes 138, 167, 198-221. 
84 See infra Part II.E.l. 
85 See infra Part III.E.2. 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 138-142. 
87 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.38 (1977). 
ss Id. 
89 Id. at 670-71. 
90 Id. at 676. 
91 In Ingraham, the Court intertwined its discussion of common-law educational practices 
with contemporary views on corporal punishment. Before the Revolution, "public and compul-
sory education existed in New England, . . . but the demand for free public schools as we now 
know them did not gain momentum in the country as a whole until the mid-1800's." ld. at 660 
n.14. Not until1918 did public compulsory education exist throughout the nation. Id. 
The common law allowed a private school master to "inflict 'moderate correction' on a child 
in his care," id. at 661 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *134), and the 
master's authority was derivative of the parent's authority to discipline a child. ld. at 662. Nev-
ertheless, Blackstone described the common law as establishing an individual's "'absolute 
right[] . . . to security from the corporal insults of menace, assaults, beating, and wounding."' 
[d. at 661 (quoting 1 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134). 
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The setting of Ingraham's story is a Florida junior high school in 1970, 
thirty years ago.92 Two students, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, 
challenged schools officials' physical punishment of them.93 Ingraham al-
leged that because he was being disruptive in a class, Principal Wright stated 
that he would hit him five times with a wooden paddle.94 When Ingraham 
refused "to assume a paddling position," two assistant principals grabbed In-
graham and Principal Wright hit him twenty times.95 Ingraham then sought 
medical attention: he took painkillers for a large bruise, he used cold com-
presses to reduce swelling, and did not attend school for ten days because 
was unable to sit.96 The pain persisted for three weeks.97 
Andrews alleged that school officials had hit him on two different occa-
sions.98 When he refused to submit to the paddle, believing that he had not 
violated a school rule, an assistant principal "struck him on the arm, back, 
and across the neck."99 He also alleged that on another occasion Principal 
Wright had paddled him on the back and wrist because he broke some glass 
during a sheet metal class.100 He too visited a doctor; his pain lasted one 
week.101 
The students alleged that school officials' hitting of them violated the 
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," 
and the procedural due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.102 
When the Supreme Court considered Ingraham, it granted review only of the 
Eighth Amendment and procedural due process claims103 and rejected re-
The Ingraham Court also considered how current society's practices differed from the com-
mon law. With the advent of compulsory education, public school officials acquired authority 
beyond that permitted by parents in order to fulfill their "custodial and tutelary" powers. 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 336 (1985), the Supreme Court explained this expansion of state power: "Today public 
school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual 
parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary 
policies." 
The Ingraham Court noted that the nation had abandoned the common law practice of 
corporal punishment for criminals and opined that "professional and public opinion is sharply 
divided on the practice [of corporal punishment] and has been for more than a century." 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660-61. Corporal punishment was "recognized in the laws of most States," 
and there was "no trend toward its elimination"-at least in 1977. /d. at 676. 
Contemporary views of corporal punishment are quite different. See infra note 117. The 
trend is now in the other direction-towards its abandonment. See infra note 117. 
92 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653. 
93 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977). 
94 Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
95 /d. 
96 /d. 
97 /d. 
98 /d. 
99 /d. 
100 Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
101 /d. 
102 /d. at 911-12. 
103 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977). 
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view of the substantive due process claim,104 noting that the students had not 
raised the Fourth Amendment as an. alternate source of protection.l05 
The Court's refusal in Ingraham to apply the Eighth Amendment to the 
students' claims resembles modern decisions that limit the Eighth Amend-
ment to prisoners' claims for brutality, by narrowly construing the Amend-
ment's scope.106 Its procedural due process analysis, however, seems dated, 
reflecting that the Court wrote on the legal slate of 1977. In Ingraham, the 
Court ruled that state-law remedies provided adequate process, even though 
students could seek protection only after school officials hit them;107 since 
Ingraham, the Court has enunciated the general rule that predeprivation pro-
cess is necessary before depriving a person of liberty.108 
1. The Eighth Amendment Does Not Apply to School Punishments 
Even though hitting students for their misbehavior constitutes "punish-
ment" under any definition of the word,1°9 the Supreme Court in Ingraham 
did not textually link this type of punishment to the Eighth Amendment's 
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause.110 Instead it relied on its histori-
cal interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as applying to punishments for 
criminal convictions.111 
In rejecting the Eighth Amendment as a basis for the students' personal 
security claims, the Court stated that school children are not prisoners.112 
One important difference for the Court was the 1970s view of corporal pun-
ishment as applied to prisoners and to students: 
Despite the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a 
means of punishing criminal offenders, the practice continues to 
104 Id. at 689 n.12. 
105 Id. at 673 n.42. 
106 See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1992) (interpreting the Eighth Amend-
ment to require prisoners to prove that officials' maliciously used physical force, whether to stop 
a riot or to control prisoners one-on-one). 
107 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676-82. 
108 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (stating that "the Court usually 
has held that the Constitution requires some kind of hearing before the State deprives a person 
of liberty or property"). 
109 See, e.g., MuRRAY A. STRAus, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISH-
MENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 8 {1994). Professor Straus noted that the language we use often 
influences how we view an act: a parent "hitting" a child sounds different from a parent "spank-
ing" a child. Id. Both hitting and spanking are violent behavior, although each has different 
connotations. Id. 
110 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670 n.39 (stating that "the Court has never held that all punish-
ments are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny"). 
111 Id. at 667 (stating "[i]n light of this history, it is not surprising to find that every decision 
of this Court considering whether a punishment is 'cruel and unusual' within the meaning of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a criniinal punishment" (citing Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); Louisiana ex rei Francis v. Resweber, 329 
U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 
(1903); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); Pevear v. 
Commonwealth, 5 Wall. [72 U.S.] 475 (1867)). 
112 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669. 
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play a role in the public education of schoolchildren in most parts of 
the country. Profession and public opinion is sharply divided on the 
practice, and has been for more than a century. Yet we can discern 
no trend toward its elimination.113 
In the 1970s, criminal punishments-except for the death penalty-did not 
include punishment to prisoners' bodies,l14 but school punishments still in-
clude the inflicting of bodily pain.115 
The Court also employed "contemporary approval of a reasonable cor-
poral punishment"116 to support its conclusion that school officials need not 
provide students with a hearing before hitting them as punishment. The In-
graham Court's state-by-state survey of current practices117 is similar to the 
113 !d. at 660-61 (footnotes omitted). 
114 Although the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), altered death 
penalty jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment, many states then "hurriedly passed re-
placement death-penalty statutes." James Acker, Robert Bohm & Charles S. Lanier, Introduc-
tion, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 7 (James Acker, et al. eds. 1998) 
(noting that, as of publication, thirty-eight states have death penalty statutes). 
115 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 660. 
116 !d. at 663. 
111 The Court's summary of state statutes and practices in the 1970s differs dramatically 
from state statutes and practices in 2000. The Ingraham Court stated: 
Of 23 States that have addressed the problem through legislation, 21 have author-
ized the moderate use of corporal punishment in public schools. Of these States 
only a few have elaborated on the common-Jaw test of reasonableness, typically 
providing for approval or notification of the child's parents, or for infliction of pun-
ishment by the principal or in the presence of an adult witness. 
Only two States, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have prohibited all corporal pun-
ishment in their public schools. Where the legislatures have not acted, the state 
courts have uniformly preserved the common-law rule permitting teachers to use 
reasonable force in disciplining children in their charge. 
!d. at 662-63. 
In contrast to the 1970s, when only two states prohibited teachers from hitting students as a 
means of discipline, today nineteen states and the public charter schools in the District of Co-
lumbia expressly forbid its use. ALASKA ADMIN. CooE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (2000); CAL. Eouc. 
CooE § 49001 (West 1993); HAw. REV. STAT.§ 3024-1141 (1998-99); 105 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 5/24-24, 5/34-84a (West 1998); IowA CooE ANN. § 280.21 (West 1999); Mo. CooE ANN., 
Eouc. § 7-306(a) (1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 37G (1996); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 380.1312 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. {l 121A.58 (Supp. 1999); MoNT. CooE ANN. § 20-4-302(3) 
(1999); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-295 (1996); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 392.4633 (Michie 1996); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (West 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.250(8)(a) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
16 § 1161ac (Supp. 1999); VA. CooE ANN.§ 22.1-279.1 (Michie 1997); WAsH. REv. CooE ANN. 
§ 28A.150.300 (West 1997); W. VA. CooE § 18A-5-1(d) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 188.31(2) 
(West 1999); D.C. CooE ANN.§ 31-2817(f) (1998). 
Fifteen states give to local school boards the discretion to decide whether to authorize cor-
poral punishment as a means of discipline. ALA. CooE § 16-28A-1 (1995) ("Teachers are hereby 
given the authority and responsibility to use appropriate means of discipline up to and including 
corporal punishment as may be prescribed by the local board of education."); ARIZ. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 15-843(B), B(2) (West 1999) ("The governing board of any school district shall, in consul-
tation with the teachers and parents of the school district, prescribe rules for the discipline, 
suspension and expulsion of pupils. The rules shall include . . . [p]rocedures for the use of 
corporal punishment if allowed by the governing board."); ARK. CooE ANN. § 6-18-505(c)(l) 
(Michie 1999) ("Any teacher or school administrator in a school district that authorizes use of 
wrporal punishment in the district's written student discipline policy may use corporal punish-
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ment, provided only that the punishment is administered in accord with the district's written 
student discipline policy, against any pupil in order to maintain discipline and order within the 
public schools."); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit 14, § 701(b) (1999) (stating that a teacher or administra-
tor has "the same authority to ... control ... and to discipline the student . . . as a parent" may 
exercise; adding that this "authority includes ... corporal punishment where deemed reasonable 
and necessary" if administered "in accordance with the state or local board of education pol-
icy"); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 232.27(1), 10) (West 1998) ("Teachers and other instructional person-
nel shall have the authority to ... [u]se corporal punishment according to school board policy" 
subject to certain additional statutory requirements.); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-730 (1996) ("All 
area, county, and independent boards of education ... to determine and adopt policies and. 
regulations relating to the use of corporal punishment."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 158.444(1), 
158.444(2)(b)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1999) ("The Kentucky Board of Education shall promulgate 
appropriate administrative regulations relating to . . . student discipline," and requiring that 
school districts report to the Board the "number of suspensions, expulsions, and corporal punish-
ments."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17 416.1B (West Supp. 2000) ( "Each parish and city school 
board shall have the discretion with respect to the use of corporal punishment."); Miss. CoDE 
ANN.§ 37-11-57(2) (1999) (stating that school officials using corporal punishment do not commit 
negligence if the hitting was in accordance with both federal law and the "rules or regulations of 
the State Board of Education or the local school board"; also adding that civil liability occurs 
only if any hitting was "in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting a wan-
ton and willful disregard of human rights or safety"); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 160.261(1) (West 2000) 
("The local board of education of each school district shall clearly establish a written policy of 
discipline, including the district's determination on the use of corporal punishment and the pro-
cedures in which punishment will be applied."); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-5-4.3A, 22-5-4.3B 
(Michie 2000) ("Local school boards shall establish student discipline policies ... and [e]ach 
school district discipline policy shall establish rules of conduct governing areas of student and 
school activity, detail specific prohibited acts and activities and enumerate possible disciplinary 
sanctions, which sanctions may include corporal punishment."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-390, 
115C-391 (1999) (stating that school officials may use reasonable force to correct pupils, provid-
ing some guidance for corporal punishment, and mandatory that local boards of education adopt 
policies consistent with other laws regarding corporal punishment); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. 
§ 3319.41 (Anderson 1999) (prohibiting corporal punishment unless the local school board spe-
cifically adopts a resolution permitting corporal discipline and forms a task force that will regu-
larly study disciplinary procedure, develop written reports, and advise the board); S.C. CoDE 
ANN. § 59-63-260 (Law. Co-Op. 1990) ("The governing body of each school district may provide 
corporal punishment for any pupil that it deems just and proper."); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-
308(a)-(b) (Michie 1999) (stating that "[e]ach board of trustees in each school district ... may 
adopt rules for reasonable forms of punishment and disciplinary measures" and insulating school 
personnel from liability for inflicting reasonable corporal punishment authorized by school dis-
trict policy). 
Without specifically addressing corporal punishment, two states generally authorize school 
boards to adopt rules for discipline. IDAHO CoDE§ 33-1224 (Michie 1995) ("It is the duty of a 
teacher to carry out the rules and regulations of the board of trustees in controlling and main-
taining discipline."); IND. CoDE ANN. § 20-8.1-5.1-3 (West 1995) (stating that "[i]n all matters 
relating to the discipline and conduct of students, school corporation personnel stand in the 
relation of parents and guardians to the students of the school corporation"; adding that "school 
corporation personnel have the right ... to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote 
student conduct that conforms with an orderly and effective educational system"). 
Eight states authorize school officials to use reasonable force to foster a safe and educa-
tional environment. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-703(1)(a) (West 1998) ("A teacher or other 
person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, may use reasonable and appropriate 
physical force ... when and to the extent it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to maintain 
discipline or promote the welfare of the minor."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(6) (West 
2001) (stating that a "teacher ... may use reasonable physical force upon [a] minor when and to 
the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary" in four circumstances: to "protect him-
self or other from immediate physical injury"; to "obtain possession of a dangerous instrument 
or controlled substance ... upon or within the control of such minor"; to "protect property from 
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Court's modern personal security litigation under the Fourth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, which also considers contemporary practices.U8 
2. Procedural Due Process Applies to School Punishments 
In determining the kind of process necessary to protect students' inter-
ests in personal security, the Ingraham Court again looked to the common 
law and to current state practices. It held that school officials do not violate 
procedural due process when they fail to hold a pre-punishment hearing 
before hitting students.119 Both the common law and modern 1970s practices 
became tools for the Court to limit students' interests in personal security.120 
Even though the Court, in a backhanded way, recognized that hitting a 
child involves a significant liberty interest, 121 it limited this interest by noting 
physical damage"; and to "restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to main-
tain order"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(2) (West 1996) ("A teacher ... is justified in 
using a reasonable degree of force against any such person who creates a disturbance when and 
to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to 
remove a person from the scene of such disturbance."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 627:6(II) (1996) 
("A teacher ... is justified ... in using necessary force ... when the minor creates a disturbance, 
or refuses to leave the premises or when it is necessary for the maintenance of discipline."); N.Y. 
PENAL LAw § 35.10 (McKinney 1998) ("A teacher . . . may use physical force, but not deadly 
physical force, upon [a person under twenty-one] when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person."); PA STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 509(2)(i), 509(2)(ii) (West 1998) (stating that "[t]he use of force upon or toward 
the person of another is justifiable if . . . [ t ]he actor is a teacher or person otherwise entrusted 
with the care or supervision for a special purpose of a minor and . . . the actor believes that the 
force used is necessary to further such special purpose, including the maintenance of reasonable 
discipline in a school, class or other group, and that the use of such force is consistent with the 
welfare of the minor"; also adding that the force used must not exceed that allowed to parents 
under state law); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws § 13-32-2 (Michie 1991) ("Superintendents, principals, 
supervisors, and teachers and their aids and assistants, have the authority, to use the physical 
force that is reasonable and necessary for supervisory control over students."); TEx. PENAL 
CoDE ANN. § 9.62(1)-(2) (Vernon 1994) ("The use of force, but not deadly force, ... is justified: 
(1) if the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of the person for a 
special purpose; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is neces-
sary to further the special purpose or to maintain discipline in a group."). 
Two states directly grant school officials the authority to use corporal punishment. OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 844 (West 1998) (stating that state law does not prohibit a "parent, teacher 
or other person from using ordinary force as a means of discipline, including but not limited to 
spanking, switching or paddling"); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 49-6-4103 (1996) (permitting any teacher 
or principal to use corporal punishment in a reasonable manner to maintain discipline and 
order). 
One state-Utah-conditions the use of corporal punishment upon written consent by a 
student's parent or guardian. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 53A-11-802(1) (1997). 
One state-North Dakota-recently repealed its prior statute that had prohibited corporal 
punishment. N.D. CENT. CoDE 15-47-47 (1999) (repealed). 
Two states-Kansas and Rhode Island have not enacted a statute addressing the use of 
force by school officials. See generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-12-3 (1956) ("Every teacher shall 
aim to implant and cultivate in the minds of all children committed to his care the principles of 
morality and virtue.") 
118 See infra Part !I.E. 
119 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 109-116. 
121 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676. The Court described the student's interest in personal secur-
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that both the common law and modem practices allowed school officials to 
inflict bodily punishment: "Were it not for the common-law privilege permit-
ting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children in their 
care, and the availability of the traditional remedies for abuse, the case for 
requiring advance procedural safeguards would be strong indeed."122 The 
Court also noted tha,t "[t]he concept that reasonable corporal punishment in 
school is justifiable continues to be recognized in the laws of most States."123 
Even though students have a "strong interest in procedural safeguards 
that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment,"124 the Ingraham Court 
found that Florida's state law-both civil and criminal-provided students 
with sufficient process for purposes of the claim under consideration-the 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.125 Because 
it did not grant review of the students' substantive due process claim, the 
Ingraham Court's procedural decision is narrow. 
Although the Court's more recent personal security cases do not focus 
on the personal security interests of students, they similarly indicate the 
Court's attempt to confine the right to personal security within one amend-
ment-in this case the Fourth Amendment-and further demonstrate its 
consideration of modem practices in describing the scope of this right. 
C. Moving Personal Security Rights to the Fourth Amendment: Officers 
Using Deadly Force 
After the Ingraham decision in 1977, courts generally continued to de-
fine the scope of the substantive right to personal security by considering 
Judge Friendly's common law Glick factors.126 But, in 1985, the Supreme 
Court, in Tennessee v. Garner,127 moved its analysis of unconstitutional force 
against citizens to the Fourth Amendment, and specifically linked police 
shootings to this amendment, rather than to substantive due process.128 
Under this Fourth Amendment analysis, two issues emerged: (1) whether the 
shooting of a suspect constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure;129 and (2) if 
ity as a "strong interest," but not one that outweighed the interests on the other side of the 
balance. !d. 
122 /d. at 674. 
123 Id. at 677. 
124 !d. 
125 Id. The Court stated: 
If the punishment inflicted is later found to have been excessive-not reasonably 
believed at the time to be necessary for the child's discipline or training-the 
school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if 
malice is shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties. 
Id. The Court's phrasing of the civil state Jaw remedy parallels its later Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, which has recognized a substantive right to be free from "unreasonable" force. 
The Court's description of the criminal penalty parallels its Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
due process jurisprudence, which has recognized a substantive right to be free from the malicious 
use of force. See infra Parts ill.2.C & E. 
126 See supra Part II.A.2. 
127 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
128 Id. at 7. 
129 !d. 
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so, whether the shooting was itself a constitutionally unreasonable seizure.130 
Under the facts of the case, the Court held that the shooting violated the 
Fourth Amendment.131 
With respect to the first question of whether the shooting was a seizure, 
the Court described, without further analysis, the officer's intentional shoot-
ing of a fleeing burglary suspect as a Fourth Amendment "seizure."132 Subse-
quent cases, however, have revealed that the Court's narrow definition of 
"seizure" in this context, and its focus on selecting one amendment for per-
sonal security litigation133 has created a constitutional chasm between the 
standards imposed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments: officials vio-
late the Fourth Amendment by acting unreasonably, but they violate the sub-
stantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment only when 
they commit shocking conduct.B4 
In Garner, the Court declared "unreasonableness" to be the primary 
standard for personal security litigation by focusing on the language of the 
Fourth Amendment, which explicitly prohibits "unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Yet, as the mass of Fourth Amendment debate and jurisprudence 
indicates, "unreasonable" is hardly self-defining. The Court attempted to 
clarify what unreasonableness means as applied to officers using deadly 
force. In doing so, the Court balanced societal against individual interests: 
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect 
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to 
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by 
using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a 
weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed 
a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent es-
cape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.135 
The Court vigorously protected the suspect's interest in personal security by 
determining that the Fourth Amendment barred officers from shooting all 
fleeing felons, a practice that had been permitted at common law.136 It 
stated, "[t]he suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not be elab-
orated upon."137 Thus, the Court implicitly recognized that the first two 
130 /d. at 9-12. 
131 Id. at 11. 
132 Id. at 7. The Court stated: 
Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized 
that person. . . . While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference 
becomes a seizure, ... there can be no question that apprehension by the use of 
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
/d. (citations omitted). These few sentences constitute the Court's entire analysis of whether the 
Fourth Amendment should apply to a police shooting. 
133 For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the "rule of Graham," see supra Part II.D. 
134 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-46 (1998); see also infra Part II.E.2. 
135 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. 
136 ld. at 12 (stating that the common law rule "allowed the use of whatever force was 
necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, though not a misdemeanant"). 
137 Id. at 9. 
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foundational Glick factors-the need for force and the amount of force-
helped to define the substantive right to personal security under the Fourth 
Amendment. The extent of injury-in this case, the loss of the suspect's 
life-outweighed the harm facing the officer or others unless the officer was 
threatened with the infliction of serious physical harm. In contrast, the 
Court's opinion implicitly rejected the fourth Glick factor-whether the of-
ficer acted maliciously, a factor later explicitly disregarded in Graham v. 
Connor as being irrelevant to determining whether a particular seizure is 
reasonable.138 
D. Applying Only the Fourth Amendment to "Seized" Persons: The 
Graham Rule 
Despite the Garner decision, some courts of appeal continued to apply 
malice as a factor when evaluating the use of nondeadly force by police of-
ficers.139 In 1989, four years after Garner, the Supreme Court, in Graham v. 
Connor, held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth 
Circuit") erred when, in its evaluation of police officers' use of nondeadly 
force, it merely considered whether malice, the fourth Glick factor, was pre-
sent.140 The Court stated that the Fourth Circuit failed to understand that the 
scope of the right to personal security depends upon the precise constitu-
tional amendment at issue: although the Eighth Amendment imposes a mal-
ice standard for the use of force during a prison riot,141 inquiry as to whether 
malice was present cannot even be a factor for a Fourth Amendment 
claim.142 Police officers violate the Fourth Amendment by acting unreasona-
bly-an objective, not subjective, issue.143 The Court articulated the doctri-
nally significant "Graham rule:" if police officers "seized" an individual by 
using force, only the Fourth Amendment applies, not the substantive due 
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.144 
138 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
139 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
140 Graham, 490 U.S. at 399. 
141 Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 n.11. 
142 One scholar has aptly noted that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is 
not the objective reasonableness standard of "tort law negligence;" rather, the Fourth Amend-
ment standard, as interpreted by courts, is "much more forgiving toward defendants." Barbara 
E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy ofPaul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REv. 569, 601-02 
(1999). Professor Armacost contends, however, that a subjective standard has its "virtues" and 
that "real loss [has been] occasioned by the Court's reallocation of excessive force claims from 
the Due Process Clause to the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 607. I respectfully disagree. Proving 
that an official's use of force was "shocking to the conscience" was, and remains, very difficult. 
See supra note 12. Although Armacost's complaints with Fourth Amendment litigation are 
sound, the problems she isolates are not with the Fourth Amendment itself or with its protec-
tions, but rather with how some courts have erroneously interpreted the scope of the protection 
that the Fourth Amendment provides for the right of personal security. See Kathryn R. 
Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, Society, and the Fourth Amend-
ment Right to Personal Security, 22 HAsTINGs CaNST. L.Q. 623,691-705 (1995) (listing nine ways 
that courts have mistakenly limited the Fourth Amendment right to personal security). 
143 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
144 Id. at 395. 
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Under the rule of Graham, as later interpreted by the Court in 1997 and 
1998 decisions, 145 prisoners similarly may assert a personal security claim 
only under the Eighth Amendment. (The Graham opinion actually had not 
so narrowly limited substantive due process; it stated that "substantive due 
process" is "at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth 
Amendment. ")146 
Even though an objective reasonableness standard for the Fourth 
Amendment is hardly surprising because it prohibits "unreasonable" 
seizures, the Graham rule is unusual because it rejects substantive due pro-
cess as an additional claim.147 When either the Fourth or Eighth Amendment 
applies to an individual's claim to personal security, the Graham rule de-
clares substantive due process to be irrelevant, even though it also protects 
personal security. In short, the Graham rule unmasks the Court's desire to 
rein in substantive due process jurisprudence.148 The Court tried to justify 
145 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). The Lewis Court quoted 
with approval United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997): 
Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific consti-
tutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be 
analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the 
rubric of substantive due process. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843. 
146 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. Prior to Graham, the Court had similarly stated that 
substantive due process, at least in the context of a prison riot, does not provide more protection 
than does the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). 
147 See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of Sub-
stantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1086, 1090-91 (1998) (stating that the rule of Graham is 
an "analytical and doctrinal oddity," and has the potential to overrule the "Court's substantive 
due process 'unenumerated rights' caselaw altogether). Professor Massaro notes that Graham 
was actually a substantive due process case, which the Court transformed into a Fourth Amend-
ment case. See id. He interpreted Graham as "another layer to the Court's resistance to any 
new substantive due process claims." Id. 
148 Through the years, many cases reveal the Justices, either together or individually, limit-
ing substantive due process as a source for protection for different kinds of interests. One deci-
sion capturing well this movement away from substantive due process in the context of personal 
security claims is Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The Court granted review to determine 
whether the alleged malicious criminal prosecution of an individual can violate substantive due 
process. Id. at 275 (plurality opinion). The Court produced six different opinions, but only Jus-
tice Stevens Goined by Justice Blackmun) declared that substantive due process was the appro-
priate basis for this type of claim. 
In Albright, the plaintiff, who was the subject of an arrest warrant for selling drugs, surren-
dered into custody and complied with a limit on his traveling outside the state. At a prelinlinary 
hearing, a judge determined that the alleged selling of a powder that merely looked like cocaine 
was not a state crime. In viewing these facts, Justice Rehnquist Goined by Justices O'Connor, 
Scalia, and Ginsburg) stated that the Fourth Amendment applied to "pretrial deprivations of 
liberty," but expressed no view as to whether the plaintiff's allegations stated a claim under the 
Fourth Amendment. /d. at 274-75 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion, reit-
erated his strong opposition to the Court employing substantive due process analysis when a 
plaintiff alleges "unspecified" liberty interests have been harmed. /d. at 275 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Justice Ginsburg found that the restraint imposed upon Albright constituted a Fourth 
Amendment seizure, and suggested that the basis of his claim may have been that the arresting 
officer was responsible for "effectuating and maintaining" the seizure. /d. at 279 n.5 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Kennedy Goined by Justice Thomas) concurred in the judg-
ment, opining that a malicious prosecution claim is one actually alleging a violation of procedu-
ral due process. Unlike Justice Scalia, however, Justice Kennedy interpreted the due process 
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the rule by relying on the "text" of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments: 
the Fourth Amendment, according to the Court, is "an explicit textual source 
of constitutional protection against this sort of physical intrusive governmen-
tal conduct,"149 but the Fourteenth Amendment is "more generalized."150 
Notwithstanding its focus on finding the "correct amendment," the Court 
found a place for substantive due process claims, stating in dicta that the Due 
Process Clause protects detainees from "excessive force that amounts to 
punishment."151 
Thus, application of the Graham rule centers on selecting a particular 
amendment to employ to examine the constitutionality of physical force by 
government officials. In other contexts, the Court has sometimes applied the 
strict rule of only allowing a claim under "one-amendment"152-and some-
clause to protect more than the liberty interests specified in the Bill of Rights. I d. at 283 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). Justice Souter found the alleged injuries to be compensable under the 
Fourth Amendment. He also explicitly discussed the Graham rule: substantive due process ap-
plies to "homeless substantial claims." Id. at 288 (Souter, J., concurring). In short, according to 
Justice Souter, if no other amendment applies to the alleged conduct, substantive due process 
will if the claim is "substantial." But only Justice Stevens Qoined by Justice Blackmun) viewed 
the claim as falling within substantive due process. Id. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens viewed the Graham rule differently, noting that "[n]othing in Graham ... forecloses a 
general due process claim when a more specific source of protection is absent or, as here, open 
to question." Id. at 305. Justice Stevens' view of Graham is literally correct, but the progeny of 
Graham reveals the Court's adoption of Justice Souter's view: substantive due process applies 
only to "homeless substantial claims." See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text. 
The fear of finding "substance" in due process is also present in the Court's early discussions 
of the "right to privacy." For example, Justice Douglas found a "right to privacy" "emanati[ng]" 
from the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights," as the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
state law that banned the use and distribution of contraceptives, even to married couples. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). He explicitly tried to distinguish this "right to 
privacy" from the much criticized economic substantive due process jurisprudence of Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Justice Blackmon later found the "right to privacy" included an 
interest in having an abortion, with this right rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's conception 
of personal liberty. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Later, Justice O'Connor boldly 
stated that the Court could interpret the word "liberty": "Liberty must not be extinguished for 
want of a line that is clear." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (O'Connor 
J., Kennedy J. & Souter J., joint opinion). 
149 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
150 Id. 
151 Jd. at 395 n.10. 
152 See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment, and not the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied to 
an attorney's challenge to law enforcement officials' search of his briefcase while his client testi-
fied before a grand jury, making the attorney unavailable for consultation); United States v. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (explaining that the Graham rule does not bar applying 
substantive due process to constitutional claims related to physical abuse by government officials 
when no other constitutional provision applies); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996) (stating that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory applica-
tion of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment"): See generally City 
of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 246 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting 
view that procedural due process applies to the execution of criminal search warrants, and stat-
ing that "the majority's conclusion represents an unwarranted extension of procedural due pro-
cess principles developed in civil cases into an area of law that has heretofore been governed 
exclusively by the Fourth Amendment"). 
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times it has not.153 
Because it inconsistently applies the single amendment rule, the Court 
has repeatedly had to explain what "the Graham rule" means. The short 
version of the Court's long and frequent discussion of the Graham rule is that 
substantive due process protection against physical force applies only when 
another Amendment does not provide relief. In the October 1998 term, for 
instance, the Court again explained the Graham rule: "[W]here another pro-
vision of the Constitution 'provides an explicit textual source of constitu-
tional protection,' a court must assess a plaintiff's claim under that explicit 
provision and 'not under the more generalized notion of "substantive due 
process.'" "154 Thus, when a claim falls under either the Fourth Amendment 
or Eighth Amendment, substantive due process does not apply, but if a claim 
raises both a Fourth Amendment claim and a procedural due process claim 
under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, both amendments apply. 
In short, the Court's distinctions simply reflect its strong movement away 
from finding substance in the substantive due process component of the Four-
teenth Amendment.155 
153 See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 60 (1992) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment applied to the removal of a person's trailer-home and rejecting the Seventh Circuit's con-
clusion that only the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause applied to this seizure). 
In Soldal, the Court explicitly recognized that actions by governmental officials may violate 
more than one constitutional provision: 
Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more 
than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are al-
leged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's 
"dominant" character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn. 
Graham is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive force should 
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process test. We were guided 
by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of governmen-
tal conduct and, as a result, we chose the more explicit textual source of constitu-
tional protection over the more generalized notion of substantive due process. 
Surely, Graham does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific 
protection for "houses, papers, and effects" rather than the general protection of 
property in the Due Process Clause. 
/d. at 70-71 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also United States v. James Daniel 
Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 51-52, 62 (1993) (holding that even if the government's ex 
parte seizure of a home did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it violated the procedural due 
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment): See generally Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 294 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (refusing to limit challenges of law enforcement search to a 
single amendment: "If their conduct had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, there is no reason why such a violation would cease to exist just because they also 
violated some other constitutional provision."). 
154 Conn, 526 U.S. at 293 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395). 
155 Similarly, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist have questioned whether the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "should displace, rather than 
augment, portions of the [Court's] equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence." 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist). Justices Thomas and Scalia have also argued that only the Fourth Amendment should 
apply when an individual challenges the process used by police officers in seizing property, and 
not the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Perkins, 525 U.S. 
at 246 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "the majority's conclusion represents an 
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The Graham rule as applied to bodily integrity claims, however, is more 
than merely a symbolic statement. It matters immensely to litigators for two 
reasons. First, the Court has narrowly defined what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure."156 If the alleged conduct does not constitute a 
"seizure" of a person, then either the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment 
"cover" the alleged conduct. Second, because the current standards for 
Eighth157 and Fourteenth158 Amendment personal claims are difficult to leap 
over, plaintiffs seek to characterize purportedly unconstitutional uses of 
physical force against them as covered by the more protective Fourth 
Amendment.159 (Ironically, in some contexts the Court has applied the same 
standard for both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.)160 
A brief summary of the Court's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment per-
sonal security decisions reveals both a protection of governmental officials 
when they need to make quick decisions161 and limitations on a person's in-
terest in bodily integrity. In contrast, the Court's Fourth Amendment deci-
sions mute, but do not obliterate, the tremendous deference to officials 
typical in Eighth Amendment decisions,162 giving greater protection to per-
sonal security. 
unwarranted extension of procedural due process principles into an area of law that has hereto-
fore been governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment"). 
156 See infra Part III.B. 
157 See infra Part II.E.l. 
158 See infra Part II.E.2. 
159 See, e.g., Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154 (lOth Cir. 2000). In Childress, 
police officers, knowing that a van contained two hostages, a woman and a child, "fired a total of 
twenty-one rounds" at it "as it passed through an intersection." Id. at 1156. The officers shot the 
woman in the "hip, leg, lungs, chest, arm and hand," and hit the child in "her chest, legs and 
back." Id. The injured hostages alleged that the police officers "were grossly negligent, reckless 
and even deliberately indifferent to their plight." I d. at 1158. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit ("Tenth Circuit") held that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard did 
not apply because the officers "did not 'seize' [the hostages] within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment but rather made every effort to deliver them from unlawful abduction." I d. at 1157. 
The shootings also did not violate the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the officers did not intend to harm the hostages. I d. at 1158. The Childress 
court relied on similar decisions from the Courts of Appeals from the First, Second, Fourth, and 
Tenth Circuits. Id. at 1157 (collecting cases holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply 
because no "seizure" occurs when police officers intentionally fired upon vehicles, causing injury 
to hostages or bystanders). 
160 See infra text accompanying notes 218-221. 
161 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1998) (rejecting a stan-
dard of deliberate indifference for a substantive due process claim that challenged the constitu-
tionality of a high-speed pursuit causing death; stating that "a purpose of causing harm" is the 
proper standard for both a police chase and a prison riot because "unforeseen circumstances 
demand an officer's instant judgment"); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (stating 
"[w]hether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption . . . 'prison administra-
tors ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and 
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to 
maintain institutional security"') (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)); see also 
infra Part II.E. 
162 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). The Court described the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard as allowing "for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." ld. at 
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E. Applying the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to Claims by Prisoners 
and "Nonseized" Persons 
I. Malice for Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Claims 
The Eighth Amendment applies when prison guards use physical force 
to control prisoners, whether during a minor cell disturbance163 or a prison 
riot.l64 In creating malice as the core inquiry, the Supreme Court unconvinc-
ingly stated that the text of the Eighth Amendment led it to recognize malice 
to be the appropriate standard.l65 Even some of the more conservative Jus-
tices thought that the Court's choice of this standard was misguided-they 
would have instead opted for a deliberate indifference standard that also re-
quired demonstration of a significant injury.166 
In declaring this standard, the Court explicitly cited the Glick factors, 
but it selected only one of them to serve as the core inquiry-the presence of 
malice.167 The Court still considered the other Glick factors as important, 
but only as methods for determining the presence or absence of malice.168 
According to the Court, the need for force, the relationship between the 
need and the amount of force, and the extent of injury may create an infer-
ence of malice.169 The Court interpreted the third Glick factor-the extent 
397. The Court also stated that officers' decisions to use force "must be judged from the per-
spective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." !d. 
at 396. 
163 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. 
164 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-22 (1986). The Eighth Amendment does not, how-
ever, according to the Supreme Court, provide any protection for students when their teachers 
hit them as punishment. See supra Part II.B.l. Even though attendance for school children is 
mandatory, the Court in 1977 found a constitutional difference in the protection for students and 
prisoners. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-72 (1977). Twenty years later, the Lewis 
Court ironically held that the protection available under the Eighth Amendment is at times 
identical to the standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, the amendment that the courts of 
appeal have applied to most corporal punishment claims raised by students. See supra note 12. 
165 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) ("The source of the intent requirement is 
not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and 
unusual punishment."). The textual games that the Court has played under the Eighth Amend-
ment have been amusing, but not persuasive. When the Court in Ingraham decided that the 
Eighth Amendment did not apply to the corporal punishment that students received for discipli-
nary infractions, the constitutional text-forbidding "cruel and unusual punishments"-was not 
prominent in the opinion. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672. And, unlike in some Fourth Amendment 
cases, there was no searching through old dictionaries for illumination as to what the word "pun-
ishment" meant. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (considering both 
old and modern dictionaries as an aid to define the meaning of a Fourth Amendment "seizure"). 
Instead, the Court relied on both the history of the Eighth Amendment and on policy reasons in 
deciding who may seek its protection. See supra Part II.B.l. 
166 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 24 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's application of 
the Whitley malice standard to "all excessive force cases [under the Eighth Amendment], with-
out regard to the constraints facing prison officials"). 
167 In both Hudson (a prison disturbance case) and Whitley (a prison riot case), the Court 
explicitly quoted Glick's malice factor as the central legal question: "whether force was applied 
in good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1028 (2d Cir. 
1973)); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. 
168 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. 
169 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 27. 
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of injury-as not requiring a significant injuryP0 It also created two new 
factors: "[1] the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably per-
ceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them 
and [2] any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response."171 
These five factors apply whether prison guards used force during a riot or just 
to control a particular prisoner.172 
Despite the Court's declaration in Wilson that the malice standard is im-
plicit in the language of the Eighth Amendment, it nevertheless has created a 
different standard under the Eighth Amendment for prisoners' bodily integ-
rity claims related to medical care173 and for conditions of confinement 
claims.174 In these related contexts, the standard is instead subjective deliber-
ate indifference to serious bodily needs and security.175 The Court also ex-
plicitly rejected Whitley's malice standard for conditions of confinement 
claims under the Eighth Amendment in Wilson.176 The Wilson Court focused 
on the "constraints facing the official" as it determined that under the Eighth 
Amendment a deliberate indifference, not a malice standard, applied to con-
ditions of confinement claims.177 These bodily integrity claims require a sig-
nificant personal deprivation; use of force claims, even those that result in 
only a de minimus injury, are actionable if th~ officials acted maliciously.l78 
The Court boldly (if naively) stated: "The source of the intent require-
ment is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, 
170 See id. 
171 In Whitley, the Court first articulated these additional factors, 475 U.S. at 321, and the 
Hudson Court subsequently cited tllem. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 
172 See id. at 6. 
173 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). 
174 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (applying Eighth Amendment to 
prison officials' duty to protect prisoners from each other); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 
(1991) (applying tile Eighth Amendment to prisoner's claim challenging his conditions of 
confinement). 
175 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Farmer Court defined this subjective deliberate indiffer-
ence standard in its holding: 
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for deny-
ing an inmate humane conditions of confmement unless the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be 
aware of facts from which tile inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. 
ld. It equated this subjective inquiry with the standard for criminal recklessness. ld. The 
Farmer Court explicitly rejected an objective deliberate indifference standard, id. at 837, because 
it equated objective deliberate indifference with civil rather than criminal recklessness: a person 
is reckless under the civil law if tile person "acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in 
tile face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be 
known." Id. at 836. The Court emphasized the difference between objective and subjective 
deliberate indifference: when determining subjective deliberate indifference, juries must decide 
whether an official actually knew the consequences of action or inaction, even though a "reason-
able person would have known." ld. at 843 n.8. 
176 Wilson 501 U.S. at 302-03. 
111 Id. at 303. 
178 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (stating that tile Eighth Amendment "excludes from constitu-
tional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that tile use of force is not of a sort 
'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'") (quoting Whitley, 415 U.S. at 327, which quoted 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
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which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. . . . An intent requirement 
is either implicit in the word 'punishment' or it is not."179 The Court at-
tempted to explain the oddity of one amendment requiring prisoners to prove 
two different states of mind depending on the type of claim asserted, by em-
phasizing the nature of the balancing inquiry necessary to determining offi-
cial misconduct. It declared, "'deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious 
illness or injury' can typically be established or disproved without the neces-
sity of balancing competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison 
staff or other inmates."180 But when the Court had to describe the Eighth 
Amendment standard for conditions affecting safety, it encountered the in-
tersection of these standards: the malice standard for officials directly harm-
ing prisoners181 versus the subjective deliberate indifference standard for 
prisoners harming each other.182 
Even though the Court has superficially tied its standard to the history 
of each amendment and to its view of constitutional text, underlying all these 
decisions is an implicit balancing of interests.183 This balancing of interests 
also became the Court's foundation for substantive due process claims under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. Balancing for Substantive Due Process Claims 
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court for the first time 
clearly articulated that "shocks the conscience" was the appropriate standard 
for substantive due process claims when a "nonseized" person seeks damages 
for the use of force by governmental officials.184 Both before and after 
Lewis, substantive due process jurisprudence has included numerous stan-
dards and descriptions, including a "professional judgment" standard, 185 an 
"undue burden" standard,l86 an explicit balancing standard, 187 a "shocks the 
conscience" standard,188 and "an implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 
179 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01. 
180 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105). 
181 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. 
182 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994). 
183 See id. at 836-38. 
184 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840-47 (1998). 
185 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (stating that "liability may be im-
posed only when the decision by the person is such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment"). 
186 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J. 
and Souter, J., joint opinion) (stating that an "undue burden" standard protects a woman's sub-
stantive Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion). 
187 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming that if a 
person has a liberty interest in refusing artificial hydration and nutrition, determining whether 
the person's Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated depends upon "balancing his 
liberty interests against the relevant state interests" (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321)). 
188 See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (concluding that "the city's 
alleged failure to train its employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was [not] an 
omission that can be properly characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitu-
tional sense"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (stating that "[s]o-called 'sub-
stantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the 
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inquiry for determining whether a person had a fundamental right.l89 Even 
though the Lewis decision attempted to show how its "conscience-shocking" 
standard underlies many of its prior substantive due process standards, 190 one 
may question how broadly to read the decision, wondering whether the 
Court will later narrowly read Lewis by limiting it to its facts. 
The Court applied the Graham rule to the facts of Lewis:191 either the 
Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment-but not both-applies to a police 
officer's accidental hitting of a passenger on a motorcycle during a high-
speed pursuit.192 It determined that only the protections of substantive due 
process applied because no Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred.193 For 
the Court, the hitting of the passenger was a mere accident, not an "inten-
tional acquisition of physical control"194 required for a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure."195 It also further explained the Graham rule-failure to find a 
Fourth Amendment "seizure" did not automatically preclude relief under 
substantive due process, even though the Fourth Amendment clearly applies 
to a wide variety of police actions.196 The Graham rule does not bar using 
conscience,' ... or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"') (quoting 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 
(1937)); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
189 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). In Glucksberg, a plurality of 
the Court offered this view of its substantive due process precedents: 
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary fea-
tures: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially pro-
tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted 
in this Nation's history and tradition,'' .... Second, we have required in substan-
tive due process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest. . . . [T)he Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ... 
'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 
Id. (citations omitted). The opinion added that unless a fundamental right is present, a govern-
ment's practice does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if the means used rationally further 
a legitimate government interest. ld. 
190 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). 
191 Two officers saw a motorcyclist after responding to a call to break up a fight. !d. at 836. 
The Lewis majority initially suggested that a police officer pursued a motorcyclist because the 
driver was speeding: the officer "saw a motorcycle approaching at high speed." Id. The officers 
had no reason to believe that the driver or passenger were involved in the fight. ld. The major-
ity later quoted the Ninth Circuit's more precise description of the reason the officer chased the 
motorcyclist: "'the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer 
told them to do so."' Id. at 838 (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion). The chase occurred at 
8:30p.m. in a residential neighborhood and lasted for seventy-five seconds. Id. at 836-37. The 
motorcyclist drove dangerously, causing others to swerve off the road. Id. at 839. Both the 
motorcyclist and the pursuing officer traveled at 100 mph. Id. The Court noted that to stop 
effectively, the police officer needed 650 feet to stop; he had in fact only 100 feet. !d. When the 
driver of the motorcycle lost control, the police cruiser accidentally hit the passenger, who died 
at the scene. ld. 
192 Id. at 842-43. 
193 Id. at 843-44. 
194 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). 
195 See infra text accompanying notes 253-272 for a discussion of what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure." 
196 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843. 
34 The George Washington Law Review [Vol 69:1 
substantive due process as a fallback claim when the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply for lack of a "seizure."197 
Next, the Court articulated what protections were available under sub-
stantive due process in this context. In defining what the phrase "substantive 
due process" means, the Court had a lot of historical baggage to consider, to 
say the least. For years, some Justices and scholars have wondered how the 
due process clause has any "substance" in it because the phrase "sounds" 
procedural.198 In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court began its descrip-
tion of substantive due process on neutral ground: due process protects 
against "arbitrary action,"199 a phrase that one may interpret to sound both in 
procedure and substance. From this noncontroversial view of due process, 
the Lewis Court followed with an astonishing statement: "criteria to identify 
what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a spe-
cific act of a governmental officer that is at issue."200 The Court categorized 
substantive due process claims as falling within one of two classes: one chal-
lenging legislative acts and the other challenging "executive" acts.201 The 
Lewis Court described these categories in a long footnote202 and mentioned 
some cases from its wide-ranging substantive due process jurisprudence. 
At issue in Lewis were the executive acts of an individual police officer, 
not legislative acts. For the Court, challenges to executive actions include 
197 !d. (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). 
198 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980) (stating that '"substantive 
due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness'"). 
199 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (citing Wolfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555 (1974) and Hurtado 
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)). 
200 !d. at 846 (citing no case for this proposition). 
201 !d. The Court did not explain what it meant by executive acts. 
202 !d. at 847 n.8. In describing these categories, the Lewis Court referred to Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997), a case in which a sharply divided court determined that a 
state statute barring a person from causing or aiding the suicide of another was not facially 
unconstitutional under substantive due process: 
Glucksberg presented a disagreement about the significance of historical examples 
of protected liberty in determining whether a given statute could be judged to con-
travene the Fourteenth Amendment. The differences of opinion turned on the is-
sues of how much history indicating the recognition of the asserted right, viewed at 
what level of specificity, is necessary to support the finding of a substantive due 
process right entitled to prevail over state legislation. 
. . .[A] case challenging executive action on substantive due process 
grounds ... presents an issue antecedent to any question about the need for histori-
cal examples of enforcing a liberty interest of the sort claimed . . . . [I]n a due 
process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behav-
ior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be 
said to shock the contemporary conscience. That judgment may be informed by a 
history of liberty protection, but it necessarily reflects an understanding of tradi-
tional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame 
generally applied to them. Only if the necessary condition of egregious behavior 
were satisfied would there be a possibility of recognizing a substantive due process 
right to be free of such executive action, and only then might there be a debate 
about the sufficiency of historical examples of enforcement of the right claimed, or 
its recognition in other ways. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (emphasis added). 
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two broad issues: whether the conduct shocks the conscience;203 and, if so, 
whether history or "other" grounds justify recognizing a violation of substan-
tive due process.204 In contrast, challenges to legislative actions focus only on 
the second inquiry into history, with probable disagreement as to how to 
characterize the right and how deeply rooted the right needs to be.205 
The Lewis Court extracted the nebulous "conscience-shocking" standard 
from Rochin v. California.206 Rochin questioned the constitutionality of po-
lice officers forcing a suspect to use an emetic to vomit the drugs he had 
swallowed.207 Because the Court decided Rochin in 1952, before Mapp v. 
Ohio applied the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the states,2°8 
Rochin considered whether substantive due process barred the government 
from using the capsules found in the vomit to convict.209 In declaring due 
process violated and suppressing the evidence, the Rochin Court stated, 
"[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience,"210 offends "even hardened sen-
sibilities,"211 and is "too close to the rack and the screw" to allow.212 
Why the Lewis Court chose "shocks the conscience" as the standard to 
meet for challenges to executive actions one can only surmise, although the 
Co1,1rt's selection of this standard is consistent with its general trend of limit-
ing the scope of the "substance" protected by the due process clause. The 
Court had granted certiorari to resolve a conflict by the courts as to the stan-
dard to apply in the context of high-speed vehicular police pursuits: "'shocks 
the conscience,' . . . 'deliberate indifference' or 'reckless disregard.'"213 In 
his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that assuming that sub-
stantive due process applies, "'shocks the conscience' is the right choice 
among the altematives."214 
With conscience-shocking as the standard, the Lewis Court attempted to 
fit its prior decisions under this rubric, a task that it failed by interpreting 
shocking conduct to include both malicious actions and deliberate indifferent 
actions in some circumstances.215 The Court reframed tort law by declaring 
that deliberately indifferent conduct at times can be "constitutionally shock-
ing."216 It stated: "It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept 
of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law 
fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at 
203 Id. at 846. 
204 ld. at 847. 
205 I d.; see also id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "history and tradition are 
the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry"). 
206 342 u.s. 165, 172 (1952). 
207 See id. at 166. 
208 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
209 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-72. 
210 Id. at 172. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). 
214 ld. 
215 Id. at 848-53. 
216 Id. at 852. 
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the ends of the tort law's spectrum of culpability."217 The Court's equation, 
that shocking conduct equals either malice or deliberate indifferent actions, 
attempts to harmonize its conscience-shocking standard with prior substan-
tive due process decisions. But it also represents a drastic limitation on sub-
stantive due process claims challenging the use of force. 
In its harmonizing, the Court ironically looked to Eighth Amendment 
cases to explain the results of its substantive due process decisions,218 an ap-
proach at odds with its insistence that the language of a particular amend-
ment determines its standard and with its neat, amendment-specific Graham 
rule.219 The harmonizing interpretative principle it employed was a single 
factor-whether officials had the luxury to reflect before acting.220 If they 
did, then the deliberate indifferent conduct committed was conscience-shock-
ing; if they did not have time to think, then only malicious conduct qualified 
as conscience-shocking conduct.221 
Pulling together its deliberate indifference cases, the Court noted that 
governmental officials have a duty to provide for the well-being of an individ-
ual in state "custody."222 For example, deliberate indifference is shocking 
when officials fail to meet the serious medical needs of detainees223 and when 
officials fail to provide for an involuntarily committed person's basic n~eds, 
such as "'food, clothing, shelter, ... and safety.'"224 The Court, however, had 
to bury in a footnote225 a similar case that had explicitly rejected a deliberate 
indifference standard-Youngberg v. Romeo.226 Youngberg examined the 
217 !d. at 848. 
218 !d. at 849-50. 
219 See infra Part II.D. 
22o Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851. The Lewis Court stated: 
As the very term "deliberate indifference" implies, the standard is sensibly em-
ployed only when actual deliberation is practical, and in the custodial situation of a 
prison, forethought about an inmate's welfare is not only feasible but obligatory 
under a regime that incapacitates a prisoner to exercise ordinary responsibility for 
his own welfare. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
221 !d. 
222 !d. 
223 See id. at 849-50. The Lewis Court discussed its prior decision in City of Revere v. Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), which had determined that substantive due 
process protects pretrial detainees' medical needs at least as broadly as the Eighth Amendment 
covers prisoners medical needs. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849-50. Prison officials violate the Eighth 
Amendment when they act with "deliberate indifference to [a prisoner's] serious medical 
needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Lewis Court characterized City of 
Revere as fitting within its shocks-the-conscience standard: such deliberate indifference "is egre-
gious enough to state a substantive due process violation." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849-50. 
224 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 199-200 (1989)). 
225 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12. 
226 457 U.S. 307, 312 n.ll & 325 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court stated, "we conclude that 
the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was 
that of the Eighth Amendment." !d. at 325. The error in the instruction was the use of "deliber-
ate indifference" as the standard, which compelled the Court to vacate and remand for a deci-
sion under the "professional judgment" standard. !d. It explained: 
The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners' rights to punishment 
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personal security interests of an involuntarily committed mental patient; the 
Youngberg Court had adopted a balancing test strongly skewed in favor of 
mental health professionals: 
[T]he decision, if made by a professional,227 is presumptively valid; 
liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional 
is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person re-
sponsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.228 
When the Lewis Court cited Youngberg, it quoted the professional judgment 
standard, and implicitly placed Youngberg in its "deliberate indifference" cat-
egory, as applied to persons involuntarily in state custody.229 Presumably, 
after Lewis, departures from "professional judgment" would now be "con-
science-shocking." 
In contrast, other types of substantive due process claims, for the Lewis 
Court, require proof of malice.230 Malice emerged as a requirement for sub-
stantive due process claims in which officials did not have time to reflect 
before acting. This single factor bridged the Court's interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment with the substantive due process component of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Lewis Court seemed to ignore how much liberty 
prisoners lose upon conviction, by allowing only the same protection to pas-
senger on a pursued motorcycle. For the Lewis Court, a high-speed vehicular 
chase is analytically similar to a prison riot, at least under the Constitution: 
only a purpose to cause harm exposes officials to constitutional tort 
liability.231 
In describing the substantive due process standard for personal security 
claims for "nonseized" individuals, the Lewis Court has shed its mask and 
revealed its explicit preference for contextual balancing. The Court previ-
ously declared that the text and the history of an amendment clearly indi-
cated a particular personal security standard.232 In contrast, the Lewis 
decision declared what really matters-the context of the alleged violation, 
not the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. Although the Dis-
trict Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gamble in charging the jury, it erroneously 
used the deliberate-indifference standard articulated in that case. 
ld. at 312 n.11. 
227 The Court also defmed a "professional" in this context: 
[A] person competent, whether by education, training, or experience, to make the 
particular decision at issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be 
made by persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of the re-
tarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including decisions that 
must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in many instances by em-
ployees without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified 
persons. 
Id. at 323 n.30. 
228 Id. at 323. 
229 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12. 
230 Id. at 852-53. 
231 ld. at 853. 
232 See supra text accompanying note 179. 
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The Court's new conscience-shocking standard will have significant doc-
trinal and litigation effects on people injured by governmental officials. Af-
ter Lewis, constitutional tort litigation seeking to protect an individual's right 
to personal security will be a strategic game: lawyers will try to pigeon-hole 
various actions as Fourth Amendment seizures (because of the Graham rule) 
and seek a jury instruction on "reasonableness." If they lose the Fourth 
Amendment claim, the fallback Fourteenth Amendment provides protection 
only in the most outrageous cases because the Court's "conscience-shocking" 
standard is the only other protection available. 
III. The Rule of Graham: Applying the Fourth Amendment to 
Public School Teachers' Use of Physical Force 
Under the Graham rule, when public school officials use physical force 
to control or discipline students, only one amendment applies.233 Histori-
cally, students have sought to protect their interest in bodily integrity under 
the Fourteenth Amendment when school officials use physical force to pun-
ish them;234 in contrast, when these same officials search them, students 
have invoked the Fourth Amendment as the source of constitutional 
233 For a discussion of the Graham rule, see supra Part Il.D. 
234 Many federal courts have examined school officials' use of force to punish for students' 
misconduct. See, e.g., Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997). In Saylor, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit") assumed that striking a student five 
times on his buttocks with a paddle for fighting during a class violated both the student's and 
parents' constitutional rights, but it held that the school officials had qualified immunity because 
the law was not clearly established at the time of the hitting. Id. at 508-10, 516. The teacher had 
allegedly asked the principal if he wanted to "watch [him] bust [the student's] butt, and school 
officials latter admitted that the force was 'excessive.'" Id. at 511. 
The Ninth Circuit in P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) held that a school 
principal did not have qualified immunity for his alleged striking of three students. The principal 
allegedly hit one student after hearing someone say "Heil Hitler.'' ld. at 1300. Without allowing 
the student to explain, he hit him '"with the back hand and then the front hand' across the 
mouth." ld. He then grabbed the student's neck and squeezed it. ld. The student had bruises 
for a few days, and he went to the emergency. room for treatment. The principal also allegedly 
struck a second student in the chest when the student failed to be quiet at a basketball game 
during a special service for a deceased drill teacher. I d. A third student alleged that the princi-
pal threw him "headfirst into the lockers" after he put back on his head the cap the principal 
asked him to remove. ld. 
The Fifth Circuit in Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) granted a principal's 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a violation of substantive due process. The principal had 
allegedly hit an emotionally disturbed student's buttocks three times. Id. at 806. The student 
had been disruptive during a class. I d. The student alleged that the hitting caused both physical 
and emotional injury, which resulted in six months in a psychiatric ward. Id. at 807. The Fifth 
Circuit reiterated its lack of interest in reviewing students' constitutional claims that school offi-
cials used excessive force: 
We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a 
teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child for certain behavior or 
whether in a particular instance of misconduct five licks would have been a more 
appropriate punishment than ten licks. We note again the possibility of a civil or 
criminal action in state court against a teacher who has excessively punished a 
child. 
Id. at 809; see also Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269,271-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that no 
substantive due process violation had occurred when a school official struck a five-year-old and a 
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protection.235 
six-year-old student five times for "snickering in the hall" and in class, despite social service 
workers' conclusion that the hitting "clearly constituted child abuse"); Woodard v. Los Fresnos 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that no substantive due process 
violation for school official's paddling a sixteen-year-old student three times for using abusive 
language to a school bus driver). 
The Tenth Circuit in Garcia ex rei. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (lOth Cir. 1987) held 
that the students' summary judgment materials were sufficient to preclude granting qualified 
immunity to school officials. The nine-year-old student alleged that school officials beat her 
twice: the first time, they held her ankles and hit her with large split board on the front of her 
legs, causing her to bleed; and the second time, they hit her buttocks, causing them to hurt for 
three weeks. /d. 
In Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit held that a student, 
but not her parents, had stated a claim for a violation of substantive due process. The complaint 
alleged that despite the parents' notice to school officials that they did not want their daughter 
subjected to corporal punishment, a teacher nevertheless maliciously and repeatedly hit her, 
pushed her into a stationery desk, and twisted her arm. /d. at 614. The student received multiple 
injuries and had to stay in the hospital for ten days. /d. She received treatment for "traumatic 
injury to the soft tissue of the left hip and thigh, trauma to the skin and soft issue of the left 
thigh, and trauma to the soft tissue with ecchyniosis of the left buttock." /d. She also alleged 
that she might always experience severe lower back pain. /d. 
In Turley v. Sch. Dist., 713 F. Supp. 331, 337 (W.D. Mo. 1989), a federal district court denied 
a teacher's motion for summary judgment for the substantive due process violation raised by 
students. The teacher had allegedly entered the classroom and saw students fighting, and she 
picked up a "plastic baseball bat and, \vithout warning, hit the students on the face, neck, shoul-
ders, and legs." /d. at 332. 
See generally Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1010, 1012 (W.D. Mich. 
1991) (holding that a deceased student stated a violation of substantive due process when a 
teacher punished him by forcing him to do a "gut run" that led to his death). In Waechter, a 
handicapped, fifth-grade student \vith known heart problems was allegedly "talking in line with 
another classmate during recess." /d. at 1007. As punishment, the recess supervisor compelled 
him to run a 350-yard sprint in less than two minutes. /d. The student died while running. /d. 
235 The case law suggests that courts recognize significantly greater Fourth Amendment 
protections for bodily privacy and security than they do for a student's privacy in objects at 
school. See, e.g., Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828-29 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (contending that New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) 
clearly established that school officials could not strip search two eight-year-old students to find 
a missing seven dollars; the majority did not determine whether a constitutional violation had 
occurred because it held that the school officials had qualified immunity for their searches); 
Konop v. Northwestern Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1208 (D.S.D. 1998) (denying school 
officials' summary judgment motion for students' claim that the strip searches they conducted to 
find stolen money violated the Fourth Amendment). In Konop, the district court stated: "The 
case law is pervasive that a strip search, the objective of which is to recover money, is illegal 
absent some reasonable indication that a particular student stole the money." Konop, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d. at 1207. The court added that, even if a limited search would have been appropriate, a 
strip search was unreasonable because the student had told the school officials that if she had 
$200 stashed in her bras or panties, it would have been noticeable without a strip search. /d.; see 
also Oliver ex reL Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (denying school 
officials' qualified immunity defense for strip searches of students to recover stolen money). In 
Oliver, two students had told their gym teacher that $4.50 was missing from the locker room. 
Oliver, 919 F. Supp. at 1211. To find the missing money, school officials searched the students' 
lockers and book bags. /d. After not finding the money, the teachers told the students to re-
move their bras in order to see if any money would fall out. /d. 
Even though the courts apply the Fourth Amendment to searches of students' belongings, 
they have often applied a deferential reasonableness standard. See, e.g., DesRoches v. Caprio, 
156 F.3d 571, 577-78 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a search of student's backpack for missing 
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Under the Court's current jurisprudence, with its disdain of substantive 
due process claims, the constitutionality of school officials' use of force upon 
students depends upon which amendment of the Constitution doctrinally ap-
plies (the Graham rule) and logically on the circumstances precipitating the 
teachers' physical responses.236 Recent Supreme Court decisions support ap-
tennis shoes was reasonable because the teacher developed reasonable suspicion by a process of 
elimination after all other students had granted permission to search). The Fourth Circuit failed 
to protect the student's Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his backpack by discounting the 
coercive effect of the school's policy of suspending students for ten days if they refused to con-
sent to searches, id. at 573, and allowed the students' (coerced) "permission" to establish reason-
able suspicion as to the student who refused to allow the search. The Fourth Circuit feebly 
explained: 
[W]hile we agree, of course, that actual suspension for refusal to consent constitutes 
such an infringement when the proposed search is unreasonable, we cannot agree 
that the Fourth Amendment is implicated merely by a demand to search coupled 
with threats of punishment, where the threats are unsuccessful in bringing about 
the individual's consent. 
!d. at 577. The court admitted that the school officials lacked reasonable suspicion as to the 
individual student bringing suit until all the other students had "consented" to the search. !d. at 
577-78. 
Similarly, in Cornfield ex rei. Lewis v. School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 
1993), the Seventh Circuit held that a strip search of a student was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, and in dicta it stated that officials would have qualified immunity even if they had 
violated the Fourth Amendment. In Cornfield, the Seventh Circuit held that school officials had 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a sixteen-year-old student enrolled in a behavior disorder 
program was '"crotching drugs"' because he "appeared 'too well-endowed"' and began yelling 
when asked about whether he was smuggling drugs. !d. at 1319. School officials then required 
him to change from his "street clothes and put on a gym uniform" as they watched. /d. Al-
though accepting this search as reasonable, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless recognized that 
some strip searches would be unreasonable: "a highly intrusive search in response to a minor 
infraction" and "a nude search of a student by an administrator or teacher of the opposite sex." 
!d. at 1320. 
The Ninth Circuit in Smith v. McGlothlin, 119 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1997) affirmed the 
dismissal of a student's Fourth Amendment search claim because officials had qualified immu-
nity. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit discussed only in dicta the constitutionality of a vice principal's 
search of a group of students; the vice principal had seen the students with a "cloud of smoke 
over their heads" and watched them make furtive gestures, suggesting the discarding of "smok-
ing materials." /d. at 787. The court suggested that reasonable suspicion was not necessary for 
the search. /d. at 788; see also Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist.. 87 F.3d 979, 980-84 (8th Cir. 
1996) (holding that a search of "all male students in grades six to twelve" was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment after a school bus driver reported to the principal that there were "fresh 
cuts" in the bus seats). The principal ordered students to remove their shoes and socks and to 
empty their pockets. Thompson, 87 F. 3d at 980. The court upheld the search as necessary to 
further "student safety and school discipline." /d. at 983; Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D.R.I. 1998) (granting school officials' motion for summary judgment on 
student's Fourth Amendment claim). In Brousseau, the district court held that officials' frisking 
of students in the cafeteria to find a missing knife used to cut pizza was reasonable. Brousseau, 
11 F. Supp. 2d at 182. It stated: "The interest of school officials in searching for drugs or weap-
ons, ordinarily is deemed more compelling and of greater urgency than searches for other kinds 
of contraband." /d. 
236 Some cases have involved school officials using physical force to control students. See, 
e.g., London v. Dirs. of the Dewitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
no violation of substantive due process occurred when a coach forcefully removed student from 
cafeteria who had engaged in "horseplay" or "scuffling." In response, the student slammed the 
coach into a table, with the coach later dragging the student on the floor for fifteen feet, causing 
the student to hit his head on a pole); Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist., 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-1016 (7th 
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plying the protection of the Fourth Amendment, not the substantive due pro-
cess component of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the use of force by school 
officials, as well as to searches by school officials.237 
Students' interest in personal security, whether it is implicated by school 
officials' using physical force to control or punish them, lies doctrinally near 
the chasm between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.238 Neverthe-
less, a student's interest in bodily integrity, under the Court's modem juris-
prudence, should fall within the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Although students hit with wooden paddles in the 1970s did not question 
the constitutionality of this practice under the Fourth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court, in its 1985 decision New Jersey v. T.L.O., applied the Fourth 
Amendment in the public schools, as it evaluated the constitutionality of a 
principal's search of a student's purse for cigarettes.239 Ten years later in 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court also applied the Fourth 
Amendment to the question of whether school officials acted constitutionally 
in requiring athletes to submit to mandatory drug testing as a condition of 
participation in school sports.240 In applying the Fourth Amendment to these 
cases, the Court considered three issues: (1) whether school officials were 
governmental actors subject to the Fourth Amendment;241 (2) whether their 
actions constituted a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment;242 and (3) if so, whether the conduct was reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.243 The Court's analysis of these issues 
supports applying the Fourth Amendment to the use of force by school 
officials. 
A. School Officials as Governmental Actors 
The seminal case that directly answered the question of whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to school teachers was New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
T.L. 0. questioned whether public school teachers simply act as substitute 
parents during the school day and thus are private persons not governed by 
the Fourth Amendment.244 The T.L.O. Court explicitly rejected such a char-
Cir. 1995) (holding that no constitutional violation under either the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendment occurred for a teacher's grabbing of a student by the arm to escort her out of the 
room after the student had told another student, "I'm going to kick your ass right here and 
now"); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1154 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a student had 
alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by claiming that a principal threw her to the 
floor and against a wall and slapped her for violating field trip restrictions); Jones v. Witinski, 
931 F. Supp. 364, 371 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that there was no substantive due process viola-
tion when teacher grabbed student, unintentionally causing student to hit his desk and the 
blackboard). 
237 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
238 The Eighth Amendment cannot apply in this context because the Court has limited the 
Eighth Amendment to safeguard only the personal security interests of prisoners, not students. 
See supra Part II.B.l. 
239 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328-33 (1985). 
240 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995). 
241 See infra Part III.A. 
242 See infra Part III.B. 
243 See infra Part III.C. 
244 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334-37. 
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acterization and held that teachers are state actors governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.245 Vernonia also adhered to this view.246 
In both T.L.O. and Vernonia, the Court distinguished between parental 
authority and teaching authority:247 school officials have both "custodial and 
tutelary" powers248 that are not linked to parental authority. In defining 
school officials' powers, the Court relied solely on modem notions of public 
education because public education was not in the fabric of our society when 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted.249 Instead, private 
education was the model, with the private school teacher having the author-
ity over a student only to the degree authorized by the student's parents.250 
With the passage of modem compulsory education laws, however, the Court 
viewed public school teachers as possessing authority greater. than that of 
parents,251 if they act "in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and 
disciplinary policies. "252 
Both decisions also noted that the Court had previously scrutinized the 
actions of teachers as state actors for alleged violations of procedural due 
process253 and the First Amendment.254 Yet, in T.L.O., the government ar-
gued that "the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amend-
ment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law 
enforcement officers."255 In response, the Court admitted that the Framers 
designed the Fourth Amendment to address the "pre-Revolutionary practice 
of using general warrants or 'writs of assistance' to authorize searches for 
contraband by officers of the Crown."256 Nevertheless, it more broadly char-
acterized the "coverage" currently provided by the Fourth Amendment: 
"The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized by countless decisions 
245 Id. at 336. 
246 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-55. 
247 Id. at 655 ("In T.L.O., we rejected the notion that public schools ... exercise only 
parental power over their students, which of course is not subject to constitutional constraints."); 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 ("Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority volun-
tarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly man-
dated educational and disciplinary policies."). 
248 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
249 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (deciding that the historical concept that school teachers are 
"private" individuals, acting on behalf of parents, "is in tension with contemporary reality and 
the teachings of' the Court). 
250 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,661 (1977) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
CoMMENTARIES *120, *453). 
251 See generally Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 
662. 
252 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
253 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which stated that 
teachers meet procedural due process requirements when discussing with students misconduct 
"minutes after it has occurred"); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
254 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 
(1988), which discussed school officials' authority to censor publications; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986), which allowed school officials to limit "offensively lewd 
and indecent speech" at an assembly; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969), which examined school officials' ability to silence personal expression at school). 
255 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334. 
256 Id. at 335. 
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of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."257 With the Court's determi-
nation that public school teachers were acting as "governmental officials" 
and not as substitute parents, the Court then applied the Fourth Amendment 
to teachers who commit searches and seizures as defined by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. Seizing a Person: The Court's Fourth Amendment Definitions 
Under both the language of the Fourth Amendment and the Court's 
Graham rule, the use of force by public school teachers must constitute a 
"seizure" of a student for the Fourth Amendment to apply.258 The Supreme 
Court has articulated several definitions of what constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment "seizure" of a person.259 
Discerning whether a "seizure" has occurred is no easy task. Not only 
has the Court given several definitions, but it has also employed conflicting 
approaches to justify its conclusion that a seizure occurred.260 Although the 
current Court considers the common law usually to be determinative of 
whether a seizure or a search was "reasonable" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment,Z61 it has explicitly rejected using the common law as the 
only means to determine what constitutes a "seizure."262 
The Court's "seizure" definitions generally fall within two broad catego-
ries: (1) governmental officials intentionally using physical force to stop an 
individual;263 and (2) officials asserting authority to compel a stop and an 
257 Id. 
258 The Fourth Amendment safeguards against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and 
the Graham rule limits personal security force clainls to scrutiny under the Fourth, Eighth, or 
Fourteenth Amendments. For a discussion of the Graham rule, see infra Part II.D. 
259 See infra text accompanying notes 262-265. 
260 See infra text accompanying notes 263-263. 
261 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). 
262 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 n.2 (1991). In Hodari D., the Court 
declared that it was both expanding and narrowing the protections provided by the common law. 
It stated, "We have consulted the common law to explain the meaning of seizure-and contrary 
to the dissent's portrayal, to e:1:pand rather than contract that meaning." Id. In the same foot-
note, however, the Hodari D. Court noted that it would not apply the common law's protection 
against unlawful attempted seizures to evaluate whether an officer's attempt to seize a suspect 
was constitutional. ld. 
263 Under this category, the narrow seizure definition is whether there was "a governmen-
tal temtination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). In Hodari D, the Court more broadly defined the use 
of physical force as a seizure: "To constitute an arrest-the quintessential 'seizure of the person' 
under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the mere grasping or application of physical force 
with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was sufficient." 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998) 
{holding that no seizure occurred because officer did not intentionally crash into person, killing 
hinl); Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 {holding that seizure occurred because officer intentionally estab-
lished a roadblock designed to stop person, killing hinl); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 
{1985) (determining that a police shooting of a fleeing felon was a seizure). See generally Hodari 
D., 499 U.S. at 626 {"The word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or 
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful."); 
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individual's compliance with that authority.264 Both categories include within 
them the notion of governmental actions limiting a person's liberty, because 
otherwise the meetings between officials and individuals would be consensual 
encounters.265 As the Court recently reiterated, "when an officer, without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the indi-
vidual has the right to ignore the police and go about his business."266 
The Graham Court explicitly left open whether the Fourth Amendment 
continues "beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention be-
gins,"267 a time when a person is not "free."268 
The first "seizure" category-physical force-evolved from the many 
cases about police officers.269 Through the years, the Court has significantly 
narrowed this definition. Initially, the Court stated that the use of physical 
force constituted a "seizure."270 It also stated that even if a person fled after 
being grabbed, a "seizure" has occurred: "The word 'seizure' readily bears 
the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to re-
strain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful."271 Nevertheless, 
for the Court to determine that a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred, the 
force used would have to amount to an "intentional acquisition of physical 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 n.16 (1968) (stating that a seizure occurs when "the officer, by means 
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen"). 
264 In Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, the Supreme Court added compliance with an official's 
show of authority as a necessary element of this type of seizure. In doing so, it had to interpret 
its prior seizure cases as only stating one of two requirements for a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
See id. Before Hodari D., the Court had focused on whether '"in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave."' /d. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
265 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1989) (framing the seizure question as 
"whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise ter-
minate the encounter"). 
266 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983)). In addition to these broad definitions, the Graham decision added a significant gloss to 
the Court's Fourth Amendment "seizure" definitions: the person subject to the actions above 
must be a "free citizen." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). In Graham, the Court 
held that "claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the 
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment ... , rather than under the 'substantive due process' approach." 
/d. at 395; see also id. at 394 (stating that the force was applied to a "free citizen"); County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844-45 (1998) (quoting with approval Pleasant v. Zamieski, 
895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990), which stated that Graham "preserve[s] fourteenth amend-
ment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or 
her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, in-
vestigatory stop or other seizure"). Nevertheless, one does not know whether the Graham 
Court's reference to a "free citizen" applies only when evaluating the actions of "law enforce-
ment officers," Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, rather than other officials, such as school teachers. In 
dicta, the Vernonia Court stated that school officials do not have a substantive due process duty 
to protect one student from another, even though school officials have "custodial" power. 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
267 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. 
268 /d. 
269 See supra note 262. 
270 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 n.16 (1968). 
271 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
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control."272 As a result of this definition, accidental use of physical force is 
not a Fourth Amendment "seizure" because it is not an "intentional" act.273 
The second seizure category-assertion of authority-has also nar-
rowed through the years. Initially, the Court held that when law enforce-
ment officers engage in a "show of authority,"274 a "seizure" has occurred. 
Later, the Court added a new requirement: the individual subject to this 
"show of authority" must comply with it.21s 
These two "seizure" categories are admittedly overly-simplified summa-
ries of the Court's complex "seizure" definitions. Applying these definitions 
is further complicated by the Court's Graham rule. For example, prison offi-
cials often "intentionally" apply physical force to control prisoners, but under 
the Graham rule, these actions are governed only by the Eighth Amend-
ment.276 A brief look at the circumstances in which the Court has applied the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments shows the difficulty of discerning when 
the Fourth Amendment applies. 
1. The Fourth Amendment: Searches and Seizures by Law Enforcement 
and School Officials 
The Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to personal security 
claims before,277 during,278 and after arrests.279 In addition, the Court has 
examined searches by public school officials under the Fourth Amend-
ment.280 (One of the school cases also involved a Fourth Amendment 
"seizure" of property which, as in many cases, followed immediately after a 
Fourth Amendment "search.")281 
Many decisions address the use of force by law enforcement officials. 
Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor examined the use of physical 
force during criminal investigations. Terry v. Ohio also noted a person's in-
terest in personal security when officers seek to conduct an investigatory stop 
and frisk.282 And, after arrest, the Court has also applied the Fourth Amend-
ment to bodily integrity claims. In Schmerber, a police officer arrested a 
driver in an automobile accident while in the hospital.283 At the officer's 
request and over the objection of the injured driver, a physician withdrew 
blood.284 Even though this search was found to be reasonable,285 the Court 
272 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). 
273 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998). 
274 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 n.16 (stating that a "show of authority" may constitute a seizure). 
275 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628-29. 
276 See supra text accompanying note 298. 
277 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-99 (1989). 
278 See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989); Tennessee v. Gamer, 
471 u.s. 1, 7 (1985). 
279 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 771 (1966). 
280 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995); New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-37 (1985). 
281 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29. 
282 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968). 
283 Sclzmerber, 384 U.S. at 758. 
284 Id. at 758-59. 
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stated that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."286 
In Winston v. Lee, the state's requested intrusion-compelled surgery to re-
move a bullet from an arrested suspect-was unwarranted under the Fourth 
Amendment287. 
In a related area, the Court also has applied the Fourth Amendment to 
wrongful seizure claims after arrest, even when bodily integrity interests were 
not involved. In both Gerstein v. Pugh288 and County of Riverside v. Mc-
Laughlin,Z89 the Court considered what process the Fourth Amendment re-
quired in order to protect a suspect's Fourth Amendment interest. 
In addition to these law enforcement decisions, the Court has also ap-
plied the Fourth Amendment to the actions of public school teachers and 
administrators who conducted searches to discern whether students had vio-
lated school rules.290 The purpose of the initial search was to further the 
school's interest in maintaining discipline and an effective educational envi-
ronment. For example, in 1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., an assistant vice 
principal opened the purse of a fourteen-year-old student based on reasona-
ble suspicion that she had violated a school rule by smoking in the bath-
room.291 This search later led to the seizure of drugs and drug 
paraphemalia.292 A decade later, in 1995, the Court decided Vernonia School 
District 471 v. Acton, six years after the Court's decision in Graham v. Con-
nor. The Court used the Fourth Amendment to examine the constitutionality 
of the school's mandatory, random urinalysis drug tests for students partici-
pating in athletic programs.293 Both school cases focused on the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Although the Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to the actions of 
law enforcement and school officials that implicate bodily integrity interests, 
it has also applied the Fourteenth, not the Fourth, Amendment to personal 
security claims involving law enforcement officials and of a state-court judge 
convicted of sexually assaulting women.294 A brief consideration of these 
285 /d. at 772. 
286 /d. at 767. 
287 470 u.s. 759, 767 (1985). 
288 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975) (holding that States "must provide a fair and reliable determi-
nation of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest."). 
289 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991). In County of Riverside, the Court attempted to impose a bright-
line test as to how prompt a probable cause hearing must be when an officer arrests a person 
without a warrant. /d. at 56·57. The Court stated that a probable cause hearing that occurs 
within forty-eight hours for a person arrested without a warrant is presumptively reasonable. 
See id. at 56. When that does not happen, the government has the burden of justifying the delay. 
/d. at 57. In addition, even a hearing that occurs within the forty-eight hour period may violate 
the Fourth Amendment if the delay was unreasonable. /d. at 56. 
290 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329. For a discussion of 
these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 229-50. 
291 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
292 /d. 
293 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
294 See infra text accompanying notes 321-25. 
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Fourteenth Amendment cases highlights the difficulty of forcing a plaintiff to 
choose between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment: The Accidental Use of Force, Force 
During "Custody," and Intentional Force Without Custody 
Under the Graham rule, the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a fallback 
amendment for personal security litigation: it applies only if neither the 
Fourth nor the Eighth Amendment implicates an individual's interest in per-
sonal security.295 Determining when the Fourteenth Amendment applies 
does not depend upon who used physical force, because the actions of police 
officers and school officials may implicate either the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.296 The Court's hodgepodge personal security jurisprudence in-
structs that the Fourteenth Amendment applies in several circumstances 
where the Fourth does not: (1) when officials accidentally use force to stop a 
person;297 (2) when officials use force on or fail to protect individuals in some 
custodial situations;298 and (3) when officials intentionally use shocking force 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 152-155. 
296 In T.L.O., the Court held that even though the Fourth Amendment historically centered 
on police practices, it also .applied to school officials. See also supra text accompanying notes 
254-257. Similarly, the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment also 
applies to police officers, whose actions trigger scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment only if 
their conduct is a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 334-37; see supra text accompanying notes 139-143, 191-202. 
297 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 569 U.S. 833, 842-45 (1998); Brower v. County of 
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-99 (1989). For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.E.2. 
298 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) 
(holding that there is no duty for a state to protect child who was not in custody at the time of 
beating); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (holding that prison officials have no 
greater duty under the Fourteenth Amendment than they do under the Eighth Amendment to 
protect a prisoner's interest in personal security during a prison riot); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 
U.S. 344 (1986) (finding no duty to protect prisoner from harm caused by another prisoner be-
cause the official allegedly acted only negligently); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) 
(holding that the state has no duty to protect pretrial detainee from slipping on a pillow on stairs 
because such negligence does not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment "deprivation"); 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (holding that a state has a duty to involuntarily 
committed mental patient "to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint"). The Court's Graham rule would require that the 
Fourteenth Amendment claims raised by prisoners in both Davidson and Whitley today would 
fall under only the Eighth Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 145-146. Since the 
Court had interpreted the Eighth Amendment to have a malice standard for prison riots and 
discipline and the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring shocking conduct, the Whitley Court 
discerned the Fourteenth Amendment as providing no "extra" protection for the right to per-
sonal security: 
We think the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source 
of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this one, where the 
deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified. It would indeed 
be surprising if, in the context of forceful prison security measures, "conduct that 
shocks the conscience" or "afford[s] brutality the cloak of law," and so violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment were not also punishment "inconsistent with contempo-
rary standards of decency" and "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. 
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Eighth Amendment personal 
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in some noncustodial circumstances.299 
The first category is easy to describe-the accidental use of force. Two 
decisions-Brower v. County of Inyo300 and County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis301-when read together create a doctrinal line between the Fourth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment as to accidental uses of force. 
The Brower Court stated that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when 
police officers accidentally use physical force and cause injury.302 In that situ-
ation, according to Lewis, the Fourteenth Amendment nevertheless does ap-
ply.303 The Lewis Court relied on precedent for its distinction between the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.304 Under its narrowing precedents, an 
accident, for the Court, was just not a "seizure."305 
The second category-the use of force during custody-is complex. 
When "custody" is present, officials sometimes have a duty to protect the 
confined person from harm, but when a person is not in custody, no duty 
arises.306 The famous case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County307 set forth this 
custodial requirement for the Fourteenth Amendment: "it is the State's af-
firmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own be-
half-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of 
personal liberty-which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protec-
tions of the Due Process Clause."308 Defining what it meant by "custody," 
the Court noted that "suspects in police custody"309 are like prisoners: the 
state has a Fourteenth Amendment duty to provide medical care to the sus-
pects,310 and the Eighth Amendment creates this same duty with respect to 
prisoners.311 This custodial duty safeguards a confined person from harming 
security standard, see supra text accompanying notes 144-144; see generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (stating that a pretrial detainee has a Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
due process protection from "conditions [that] amount to punishment of the detainee"). 
299 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 201-63 (1997) (discussing the criminal 
conviction of a state-court judge who had been found guilty of violating the substantive due 
process rights of women he had sexually assaulted); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
115, 128 (1992) (holding that a governmental employer's failure to provide a safe working envi-
ronment was not "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense"). For a discussion 
of this category of due process violation, see infra text accompanying notes 325-329. 
300 489 u.s. 593 (1989). 
301 569 u.s. 833 (1998). 
302 Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99. 
303 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842-45; for a discussion of this case, see supra Part II.D.2. 
304 /d. at 843-44 (relying on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) and Brower, 
489 U.S. at 596-97. For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 262-264. 
305 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843-44. 
306 See infra notes 308-308. 
307 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
308 !d. at 200. 
309 !d. at 199. 
310 !d. (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts, 463 U.S. 239,244 (1983)); see also Lewis, 523 
U.S. at 850 (stating that "deliberately indifferent conduct must also be enough to satisfy the fault 
requirement for due process claims based on the medical needs of someone jailed while awaiting 
trial"). 
311 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
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herself,312 from other confined persons harming her,313 and from state offi-
cials harming the confined persons.314 
What the DeShaney Court meant by "other similar restraint," however, 
is unclear. In Vernonia, the Court examined the degree of control officials 
have over students as it evaluated, under the Fourth Amendment, the consti-
tutionality of drug testing some students. In dicta, the Vernonia Court men-
tioned the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that school officials did not have 
a Fourteenth Amendment "'duty to protect' "315 students from harming each 
other. Even though school officials have "custodial and tutelary" powers,316 
they do not have the necessary "degree of control over children as to give 
rise to a constitutional" duty.317 School officials thus have "custodial" pow-
ers, but students are not in "custody."318 Perhaps students are "free citizens" 
as described in Graham319 and subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny when a 
"search" or "seizure" occurs. 
Similarly, when officials arrest a person, officials clearly have "custody" 
of the person. Under Supreme Court precedents, such "custody" is a seizure, 
subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.320 But the Graham Court 
also noted in dicta that at some point the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
the confined suspect: the Fourteenth Amendment protects the personal se-
curity interests of "pretrial detainees" in being free "from excessive force 
that amounts to punishment."321 It did note,· however, that it had not re-
solved the following question: "whether the Fourth Amendment continues to 
provide individuals with protection against deliberate use of excessive force 
beyond the point at which arrests ends and pretrial detention begins."322 
312 See generally Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (holding that a violent 
involuntarily committed person has liberty interests that "require the State to provide minimally 
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint"). The 
Court has also upheld the involuntarily commitment of individuals dangerous to the public. See, 
e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U:S. 346, 366 (1997) ("While we have upheld state civil commit-
ment statutes that aim both to incapacitate and to treat, . . . we have never held that the Consti-
tution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who 
nevertheless pose a danger to others"). 
313 See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320. 
314 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (stating that the Due Process 
Clause "protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punish-
ment") (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). 
315 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (quoting DeS haney v. Winne-
bago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). 
316 ld. 
317 ld. In contrast, ten years earlier in New Jersey v. T.L.O., two Justices had characterized 
this custodial power as creating an "obligation" for school officials to protect both students and 
teachers from misbehaving students. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., 
concurring) Goined by Justice O'Connor). 
318 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
319 See supra text accompanying note 312. 
320 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (stating that "all claims that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, inves-
tigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amend-
ment and its 'reasonableness' standard."). 
321 Id. at 395 n.10. 
322 !d. 
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Thus, if the purpose of the force was to "punish," then the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies, according to the Court, but if the force applied was not 
to punish, then it is unresolved whether the Fourth Amendment may still 
apply. 
The third category-intentional force without custody-provides that 
egregious conduct by state officials violates the Constitution, even if the force 
used does not seem to fall easily under any other amendment. The Court 
used substantive due process to disapprove of state officials' egregious be-
havior when it decided Rochin v. California323 in 1952, because at that time 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states.324 
Similarly, the Court in Lanier allowed substantive due process to apply 
to the egregious conduct of a state-court judge convicted of sexually assault-
ing "several women in his judicial chambers."325 The women were not in any 
sense in "custody," but were harmed by a person abusing his state position 
of power. For these actions, substantive due process was the proper claim. 
In upholding the judge's criminal conviction,326 the Court quoted an instruc-
tion the jury used in finding that the judge violated substantive due pro-
cess.327 The instruction questions whether the actions were conscience-
shocking. With "conscience-shocking" as the substantive due process stan-
dard, one can easily discern why under the rule of Graham Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process is a fallback claim: if one proves "con-
science-shocking" conduct, then the same verdict would occur under the 
Fourth Amendment or Eighth Amendment, if they applied. If one cannot 
meet this incredibly high standard, however, the result might be different 
323 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
324 In 1998, the Court noted that "today [Rochin] would be treated under the Fourth 
Amendment." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998). In Rochin, police 
officers forcibly entered the suspect's room, questioned him about capsules near his bed, and 
jumped him when the suspect swallowed them. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. After the suspect was 
handcuffed, he was taken to a hospital where a doctor, at the request of police officers, "forced 
an emetic solution through a tube into [the suspect's] stomach against his will" to recover the 
two capsules. ld. 
325 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261 (1997). 
326 At issue was whether a violation of "substantive due process" gave the judge sufficient 
notice that his actions made him criminally liable under a federal statute. Id. 
327 ld. at 262. The instructions provided as follows: 
Included in the liberty protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth 
Amendment is the concept of personal bodily integrity and the right to be free of 
unauthorized and unlawful physical abuse by state intrusion. Thus, this protected 
right of liberty provides that no person shall be subject to physical or bodily abuse 
without lawful justification by a state official acting or claiming to act under the 
color of the laws of any state of the United States when that official's conduct is so 
demeaning and harmful under all the circumstances as to shock one's consci[ence]. 
Freedom from such physical abuse includes the right to be free from certain sexu-
ally motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. It is not, however, 
every unjustified touching or grabbing by a state official that constitutes a violation 
of a person's constitutional rights. The physical abuse must be of a serious substan-
tial nature that involves physical force, mental coercion, bodily injury or emotional 
damage which is shocking to one's consc[ience]. 
Id. (quoting Appendix, 186-87). This instruction appears consistent with the Court's recent 
glosses on sub,stantive due process in Lewis. See infra Part II.E.2. 
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under the Fourth or Eighth Amendment than under the Fourteenth. Conse-
quently, the Court's personal security jurisprudence ensures that which 
amendment applies matters in modem litigation. 
The Court's distinctions between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment are difficult to comprehend. One would have logically thought that the 
Fourth Amendment governs the actions of police officers alone. But, in mak-
ing clear that the type of action is more significant than who performs it, the 
Court has laid the groundwork for applying the Fourth Amendment to the 
use of force by school officials. 
C. School Officials' Use of Physical Force as a Fourth Amendment 
"Seizure" 
When students leave their homes and enter the public schools, they be-
come subject to the authority of school officials, who have both "custodial 
and tutelary" powers.328 In exercising these powers, school officials apply 
physical force to students in two general ways: (1) to stop a student from 
harming another student or school official; and (2) to punish a student for 
violating a school rule. When officials use physical force in this manner, their 
actions implicate the Fourth Amendment because, under the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence, their actions are seizures. 
But, the Supreme Court has never addressed whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to force used against students. Yet, 'in Ingraham, it dis-
cussed the bodily integrity interests of students in conjunction with its deter-
mination that students were not entitled to a hearing prior to a school official 
punishing them for their misdeeds in schooJ.329 The Court described the pro-
cedural liberty interests of students; it did not grant review to determine 
whether corporal punishment violated substantive due process, and it noted 
that the students did not raise the Fourth Amendment as a basis for 
recovery. 330 
328 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
329 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977). The Court balanced interests in Ingra-
ham, and one could arguably conclude that its analysis here suggests that students would have 
difficulty meeting either the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard or the Fourteenth 
Amendment's "shocks-the-conscience" standard. The Court, however, decided Ingraham in 
1977, long before its more detailed personal security jurisprudence. 
In 1977, bodily integrity claims-those of criminal suspects, detainees, and students-did 
not fall within a particular Bill of Rights provision. Instead, the co=on sense Glick factors 
were a part of most courts' inquiries as to whether the force violated the Constitution. See 
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d. 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). Not until1985 did the Court specify that uses of 
deadly force by police officers should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, 
the Court also stated that it would assess reasonableness by looking at evolving police prac-
tices-not just the co=on law. Thus, balancing interests today, whether done under the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness standard or the Fourteenth Amendment's "shocks-the-con-
science" standard, differs from the Court's balancing in 1977, which lacked important social sci-
ence data now available in 2000. See Urbonya, supra note 1. In addition, balancing focuses on a 
different issue-whether a standard has been violated; it does not address which amendment 
applies. 
330 Ingraham, 490 U.S. at 660 n.12, 673 n.42. 
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In determining whether force to control students constitutes a "seizure," 
one must study what the Court said in New Jersey v. T.L.0.331 and its prog-
eny. In these decisions, the Court easily extended the Fourth Amendment to 
apply to the actions of school teachers seeking evidence that students had 
violated school rules. The Court could have looked at these same actions 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and asked whether the school officials' 
action implicated the "liberty" interests of students.332 It did not. Instead, it 
viewed school officials' searches as invading the privacy interests of students 
safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, even when what was at issue was a 
violation of school rules. 
After T.L.O., the Court. created the rule of Graham: if the Fourth 
Amendment applies to official actions implicating personal security, then 
substantive due process does not apply. In these school cases, the Fourth 
Amendment applied because school officials engaged in "searches," an activ-
ity to which the Fourth Amendment usually applies. When school officials 
use physical force to control students, they "seize" them within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the Court's well-established, but 
narrowing, "seizure" doctrines easily apply to uses of force by school 
officials. 
331 469 U.S. 325 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 
244-249. 
332 See Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 634-35 (1997). Professor Wells has been a vigorous advocate of 
applying the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Fourth Amendment, to actions that implicate 
an individual's interest in personal security: 
The blunt truth is that the Court in Gamer and Graham significantly extended the 
range of interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, and did so with virtually no 
discussion of the step it was taking. There is nothing in the background of the 
Fourth Amendment, nor in the Fourth Amendment precedents before Garner, to 
support the notion that one of the amendment's aims is to protect the interest in 
personal security against physical harm. 
!d. at 628-29 (footnotes omitted). Professor Wells has criticized applying the Fourth Amend-
ment to the actions of police officers that infringe on a person's interest in personal security. /d. 
at 629-31. Instead, he views the Fourth Amendment as safeguarding a person's interest in pri-
vacy. /d. at 628. According to Professor Beerman, Professor Wells' standard for government 
actions covered under substantive due process is quite broad-simply asking "whether there was 
an abuse of power by the defendant official." Jack M. Beerman, Common Law Elements of the 
Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 695, 744 (1997). Although the Supreme Court has 
stated that arbitrary action is actionable under the substantive due process component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra text accompanying note 199, Professor Beerman soundly per-
ceives the modern Court's preference against using substantive due process as a basis for a con-
stitutional violation makes such a finding unlikely: 
The Court has expressed extreme reluctance to recognize new claims under sub-
stantive due process. . . . It may be, given the Court's resistance to constitutional 
tort litigation, that an actual substantive due process standard would be extremely 
difficult to meet and that plaintiffs are better off if they can base their claims on a 
particular provision of the Bill of Rights. 
/d. at 745. Professor Beerman's view of the difficulty of establishing a substantive due process 
violation was borne out in the Supreme Court's decision rendered soon after his article-County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis. For a discussion of this case, see supra Part II.E.2. 
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1. Force Used to Control Students 
When students physically fight or are on the verge of obvious violence, 
school officials reasonably exercise their custodial and tutelary powers by in-
tervening. When these officials grab students, they seize students within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because their actions fall within the 
Brower definition of an "intentional acquisition of physical control." Public 
school officials perform the same type of act that the Court has clearly la-
beled a seizure when police officers perform it.333 Both the police officer and 
school officials use physical force to control their environment. Whether this 
grabbing violates the Fourth Amendment is a separate inquiry, one that re-
quires defining "reasonableness" in the context of the public schools. 
If the grabbing is ineffective and students break away, then only the ini-
tial grabbing is a "seizure." As the Court explained in Hodari D., "during the 
period offugitivity," there is no continuing "seizure."334 In addition, compul-
sory attendance laws do not make students "seized" throughout the day as 
they attend public school because they may nevertheless attend private 
schools, where the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because private 
school teachers are not "governmental" actors under the Court's state-action 
doctrine. In many respects, public school students are therefore like the 
"free citizens" referred to in Graham. When public school officials use inten-
tional physical force, they effectuate a "seizure" that is neither a classic arrest 
nor an investigatory stop but a type of the "other 'seizure' of a free citizen" 
that Graham mentioned. 
Even though school officials perform acts of policing similar to those 
done by law enforcement officials, one further distinction is necessary before 
the use of physical force to control falls under the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment: the appropriate use of force in schools differs dramatically from 
the kind of sexual assault claims that have generally been considered under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Both actions implicate the kind of "grabbing" 
that the Fourth Amendment concerns. But, these acts differ in their purpose: 
in one situation the force used is to control the school learning environment; 
a school official may simply err in judgment as to the appropriate degree of 
force. Yet, in the sexual abuse case, any physical contact is wrong from the 
moment of touching. Lower courts have recognized this distinction by apply-
ing the Fourteenth, and not the Fourth, Amendment to the actions of police 
officers who sexually assault individuals that they have stopped pursuant to 
their Fourth Amendment powers.335 
333 See infra text accompanying notes 267-73. 
334 California v. Hodari D., 490 U.S. 621, 625 (1991). 
335 See, e.g., Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to a claim that a police officer raped person stopped for 
traffic violation, stating "that no amount of force could have been reasonable to achieve [this 
officer's] purpose" and concluding that his actions were "shocking"); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 
620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Because the [alleged rape] inflicted did not occur in the course of an 
attempted arrest or apprehension of one suspected of criminal conduct, ... the claim was not 
one of a Fourth Amendment violation, but of the violation of the substantive due process right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law _ 
to the wanton infliction of physical harm"). 
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Although Fourth Amendment inquiries are generally "objective" and re-
frain from examining the motivations of the actor, the T.L.O. Court never-
theless looked at the purpose of the school officials' actions in deciding 
whether the Fourth Amendment applied to searches of students. It stated: 
"Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily 
conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of 
publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies."336 Thus, in using 
physical force to control students, school officials seek to maintain the edu-
cational environment. 
School officials thus effect a Fourth Amendment "seizure" when they 
use physical force to break up a fight or to stop one from happening. These 
actions are intentional and result in control over the student, who would oth-
erwise be at liberty to leave. 
2. Force Used to Punish Students 
In contrast, when school officials use physical force to punish students, 
the context differs. Nevertheless, how one imagines and characterizes the 
protean interactions between school officials and students does not alter the 
essential analysis of the Fourth Amendment: when school officials intention-
ally use physical force to punish students, their actions constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure because the students would not be "free to leave." 
Most officials likely would assert that the purpose behind their hitting 
was to instill discipline and maintain an effective learning environment.337 
School officials therefore intentionally use physical force to acquire control 
over the struck students. In addition, in most circumstances, students submit 
to officials' show of authority and receive their physical punishment. The act 
of hitting in the context of corporal punishment is thus similar to the use of 
physical force to control disruptive students, except that the need for imme-
diate action is significantly less obvious: students ready to hit each other pose 
a greater threat to order or than do students who refuse to quit talking during 
an exam. Nevertheless, the acts performed by school officials are similar. 
When officials use physical force to punish students, their actions impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment, despite the Court's dicta in Graham that pre-
trial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from 
"excessive force that amounts to punishment."338 The progeny of Graham 
strongly moves away from finding substantive rights in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.339 In contrast to the pretrial detain-
ees discussed in Graham, students are free to leave after school officials 
strike them; pretrial detainees still remain confined, subject to the state's con-
tinued authority over them. Because physical force used to discipline or pun-
ish falls within the Court's ever narrowing "seizure" definitions, students 
336 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985). 
337 See, e.g., IRWIN A. HYMAN, ET AL., ScHOOL DISCIPLINE AND ScHooL VIOLENCE: THE 
TEACHER VARIANCE APPROACH 334-35 (1997) (stating that some teachers resist banning corpo-
ral punishment because of their misconception that hitting students controls violence in the 
schools). 
338 See supra text accompanying notes 233-235. 
339 See supra text accompanying notes 234-237. 
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today may seek protection under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 
standard. 
IV. Conclusion 
Public school students have an interest in personal security safeguarded 
by the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Historically, most courts have interpreted students' 
personal security claims to fall under the substantive due process component 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides nominal protection.340 In 
light of modem personal security jurisprudence, this Article advocates apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard when school officials 
use physical force that constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." As a re-
sult, when school officials grab students to break up fights or use bodily pain 
to punish students, courts should analyze the resulting constitutional tort 
claims under the Fourth Amendment. 
The difference between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment is doc-
trinally significant because the Supreme Court has created multiple standards 
for personal security claims depending on the context of the incident chal-
lenged. Although the Court has articulated numerous standards to establish 
a violation of substantive due process, its most recent exegesis of personal 
security litigation in County of Sacramento v. Lewis suggests that students' 
personal security claims will virtually always fail if they are litigated under 
substantive due process, and not fail so consistently if litigated under the 
Fourth Amendment. In Lewis, the Court held that only conduct that is egre-
gious-shocking to the conscience-establishes a violation of substantive due 
process. In contrast, under the Court's Fourth Amendment personal security 
litigation, a violation occurs if officials used unreasonable force. 
Although abstract theory (~nd logic) would easily support giving signifi-
cant and equal weight to the right to personal security, no matter whether the 
right falls under the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court, has nevertheless articulated the Graham rule, declaring that only one 
amendment applies when persons challenge officials' use of physical force. If 
students are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, then they fall into the 
deep chasm of the Fourteenth Amendment's conscience-shocking standard, 
which provides little protection. 
The Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard properly foster 
public education by safeguarding students' cherished interest in personal se-
curity and protecting schools' ability to provide an educational environment, 
one free from unreasonable violence from school officials.341 
340 See supra note 12. 
341 See, e.g., Patrick V. Gaffney, Arguments in Opposition to the Use of Corporal Punish-
ment: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, REPORT-150, at 5 (Dept. of Ed., Mar. 17, 1997) 
(determining that physical punishment "represents a violation of children's rights and a debase-
ment of the primary goals of education"); PAULA M. SHORT, RICK JAY SHORT, CHARLIE BLAN-
TON, RETHINKING STUDENT DISCIPLINE: ALTERNATIVES THAT WoRK 86 (1994) (advocating 
positive reinforcement as the best method to discipline students); CHARLES H. WoLFGANG, 
SOLVING DISCrPLINE PROBLEMS, 13-264 (1995) (detailing positive approaches to student disci-
pline). See generally MYRA C. CHEN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CoRPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISON-
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ERS, SAILORS, WoMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 34 (1984) (noting that 
"educational leaders angrily condemned teachers who refused to substitute moral suasion for the 
rod and the birch"). 
